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Abstract 
 
This thesis assesses the case for introducing an imaginative counterpart to 
desire. The first chapter considers what an imaginative counterpart is, and 
some  initial  worries  related  to  introducing  an  imaginative  counterpart  to 
desire. The second chapter considers whether our third person mindreading 
abilities, and a puzzle about what mental states motivate children’s pretend 
play,  give  us  reason  for  introducing  i-desires.  The  third  chapter  considers 
whether  we  have  to  introduce  i-desires  to  make  sense  of  the  desires  we 
apparently direct towards fictional characters. I will argue that introducing 
i-desires deepens the puzzles related to these three cases, and that genuine 
desire-based solutions do a better job of making sense of them. I will thus 
conclude that desire does not have an imaginative counterpart.   4	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Introduction 
 
In this thesis I am going to argue that desire has no ‘imaginative counterpart’ – 
that there is not a form of imagining that is ‘desire-like’ in character. Defenders 
of the existence of desire-like imaginings, or i-desires as they tend to be called, 
argue that their introduction is warranted because they help to explain our 
third person mindreading abilities, what motivates children to engage in games 
of  pretence,  and  why  it  looks  like  we  can  direct  desires  towards  fictional 
characters. I am going to argue that these activities are better explained by 
relying on explanations invoking ordinary desires, not i-desires. 
 
Before we consider the puzzles related to desire that mindreading, pretend play 
and our engagement with fiction give rise to, we will need to get a better idea of 
why philosophers usually introduce imaginative counterparts, and how they 
are thought to behave. This will be the subject of chapter 1. I will make three 
central claims about how imaginative counterparts behave and when we are 
justified in introducing them.  
 
Firstly, I will argue that there are two types of imaginative counterpart. The 
first type is where one wilfully enters into a mental state that is in some sense 
similar to an ‘actual’ mental state. The second is where a real world action or 
feeling constitutes a fictional action or feeling. In light of this distinction, we 
should not presume that imaginative counterparts must always be under the 
control of the will, since one can allow that a mental state has a counterpart in 
the second sense whilst denying that it has a counterpart in the first sense. 
 
Secondly, I will argue that noting an instance of a real world action constituting 
a fictional action is not a sufficient justification for introducing an imaginative 
counterpart. I will bring this out in section 1.7 in relation to amusement, since 
it looks like one can be described as being amused within the scope of pretence 
even though amusement has no imaginative counterpart. It is made true that 
one is fictionally amused by one being really amused. 
 
Thirdly, I will propose that there are two related sorts of arguments we can give 
to  justify  the  introduction  of  an  imaginative  counterpart.  The  first  sort  of 7	 ﾠ
argument involves noting constraints on being in a particular mental state, and 
then noting a case where one appears to be in that mental state when these 
constraints  have  been  violated.  We  can  then  justify  the  introduction  of  an 
imaginative  counterpart  to  explain  this  discrepancy.  The  second  sort  of 
argument works by looking at a specific case where it seems puzzling to think a 
genuine instance of a mental state is involved, and then moving to suggest that 
we should introduce an imaginative counterpart to make sense of this puzzling 
case. 
 
In  relation  to  these  three  claims  and  desire,  I  will  note  that  it  is  unclear 
whether we can make sense of imagining desiring something at will, and as 
such if desire has an imaginative counterpart it will be one where real world 
actions  or  feelings  constitute  fictional  actions  or  feelings.  I  will  conclude 
chapter 1 by noting that it is unclear what constraints are operative on our 
desires, and that we therefore cannot justify the introduction of a counterpart 
merely by considering the nature of desire. As such, we will need to focus on 
why  specific  cases  where  an  imaginative  counterpart  to  desire  has  been 
introduced are thought to be puzzling. This will be task of chapters 2 and 3. 
 
In  chapter  2,  we  will  discuss  mindreading  and  pretend  play.  In  relation  to 
mindreading,  simulation  theorists  like  Currie  (1995)  have  argued  that  our 
ability to predict peoples’ actions and ascribe mental states to them is based on 
an  ability  to  simulate  their  mental  states.  More  specifically,  simulation 
theorists claim that mindreading depends on an ability to simulate beliefs and 
desires,  and  Currie  (1995,  pp.  157-160)  argues  that  these  simulated  mental 
states are best thought of as imaginative counterparts.  
 
These sorts of imaginative counterparts are counterparts in the first sense I 
noted: they are similar to another mental state and can be entered into at will. 
Against this picture, I am going to argue that it is unclear that we can always 
enter into a mental state with desire-like character at will. Furthermore, we can 
give an alternative explanation of mindreading by allowing that we can either 
form  belief-like  imaginings  about  others’  desires,  or  beliefs  about  others’ 
desires. I will also note that the counterpart to desire that is supposed to be 
involved  in  pretend  play  and  our  engagement  with  fiction  appears  to  be 8	 ﾠ
distinct from the one involved in mindreading, since it is not similarly under 
the control of the will. This rules out justifying the introduction of desire-like 
imaginings to explain mindreading on the grounds that they are an accepted 
part of our cognitive architecture. 
 
In relation to pretend play, the puzzle that an imaginative counterpart to desire 
is meant to solve relates to difficulties specifying the kinds of mental states that 
motivate pretend actions. For example, if a child is playing cops and robbers 
and raises a finger towards her playmate and says ‘bang you’re dead’, what sort 
of  desire  can  explain  this  action?  It  appears  that  it  cannot  be  a  desire  to 
actually kill the playmate, and it also looks like it cannot (merely) be a desire to 
raise  their  finger  and  utter  these  words.  Thus,  some  philosophers  have 
proposed that we should say in this case something like the child i-desires to 
kill the robber (Doggett and Egan 2007). 
 
However, this leaves a crucial element of the pretence unexplained: how the 
child is able to match up their real world action (finger raising) with a fictional 
action (shooting the robber). I will argue that the best way to make sense of 
this is to propose that children desire to make it fictionally true that such-and-
such  occurs  when  they  engage  in  games  of  pretence.  This  will  allow  us  to 
explain pretend play without introducing an imaginative counterpart to desire. 
 
In  chapter  3  I  will  consider  a  puzzle  about  how  our  desires  can  relate  to 
fictional characters. One might think it is problematic to hold that we can have 
genuine desires related to something known to be fictional, and as such some 
philosophers  have  suggested  that  when  we  engage  with  fictions  we  actually 
have  desires  about  the  fictions  themselves,  rather  than  fictional  characters 
(Nichols 2004b). However, this appears to be problematic in relation to some 
genres,  like  tragedy,  since  this  view  will  construe  us  as  having  conflicting 
desires: desiring, for example, that a tragic heroine both does and does not die 
in  the  fiction.  As  such,  some  philosophers  have  proposed  that  we  need  to 
introduce  i-desires  here.  They  suggest  we  i-desire,  for  example,  that  Juliet 
avoids her fate whilst genuinely desiring for Romeo and Juliet to have a tragic 
conclusion (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, Doggett and Egan 2011). 9	 ﾠ
In response, I will argue that it is unclear why we should feel forced to move 
from desires about fictional characters to desires about fictions, which weakens 
the justification for introducing i-desires here. I will then consider a further 
problem case from Currie (2010), which is supposed to be inexplicable in terms 
of desires about fictional characters, and thus is said to force us into accepting 
either the desires about fiction explanation or the i-desires explanation.  
 
In  light  of  this,  Currie  argues  that  since  the  desires  about  fiction  account 
sometimes  problematically  construes  us  as  having  conflicting  desires,  an  i-
desire based account of our engagement with fiction is preferable. I will end 
this  chapter  by  questioning  whether  his  argument  forces  us  to  abandon  an 
explanation that allows for desires about fictional characters, and by noting 
some reasons for thinking real desires have explanatory value in the fiction 
case. 
 
Having considered these three cases in detail, I will conclude that we are not 
warranted in introducing i-desires into our cognitive architecture. I will also 
bring out that even if one found the arguments for introducing them in one of 
these three cases compelling, we still cannot justify their introduction in all 
three cases, since it looks like i-desires have to behave differently in each case. 
In turn, if i-desires can only explain one of these cases, it looks like they have a 
limited explanatory role, which will further weaken the case for introducing 
them. 
 
Having set out the structure of the thesis, we can now begin chapter 1, where I 
will set out my claims about the nature of counterparts and our justification for 
introducing them. 
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Chapter 1: Imaginative Counterparts 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In order to determine whether desire has an imaginative counterpart, we must 
first get clearer on what it means to say that a mental state has an ‘imaginative 
counterpart’  and  why  philosophers  have  proposed  their  introduction.  In 
pursuing these issues we can establish three principles, which will be central to 
establishing whether desire has an imaginative counterpart: 
 
1) ﾠ There are (at least) two kinds of imaginative counterpart a) where we 
enter into at will a state that is similar to a genuine mental state, and b) 
where  real  world  actions  or  feelings  constitute  fictional  actions  or 
feelings. 
2) ﾠ Noting a case where a fictional action or feeling is constituted by a real 
world action or feeling is not sufficient justification for introducing an 
imaginative counterpart.  
3) ﾠ To justify the introduction of an imaginative counterpart, we either need 
to establish a) that there are constraints on being in a mental state that 
necessitate the introduction of a counterpart, or b) note a case where 
positing a genuine mental state is involved leads to puzzles.  
 
I will begin to establish these three claims by setting out Walton’s (1973, 1990: 
Ch. 1) make-believe account of our engagements with fiction. Having set out 
Walton’s account, I will then consider two relatively uncontroversial cases of 
mental  states/activities  that  are  thought  to  have  imaginative  counterparts: 
belief and seeing. Philosophers introduce these two counterparts since it looks 
like there are constraints on what it takes to be a genuine belief or episode of 
seeing that necessitate the introduction of an imaginative counterpart.  
 
The discussion of seeing and Walton’s (1973) account of depiction will bring 
out the first central claim of this chapter viz. that there are at least two types of 
imaginative  counterparts  at  play  in  philosophical  discussions  of  the 
imagination: one subject to the will, and the other arising when certain real-
world actions and feelings constitute a make-believe action or feeling. 11	 ﾠ
Having established this claim, we will then consider a more controversial case 
– the emotions. Some philosophers, such as Walton (1978), have suggested 
that constraints on feeling a genuine emotion necessitate the introduction of 
‘quasi-emotions’. If this is right we then have to introduce counterparts like 
quasi-fear, quasi-sadness, quasi-pity, etc.  
 
However, philosophers such as Carroll (1990: Ch. 1) have rejected the idea that 
emotions have an imaginative counterpart. I will remain neutral on this issue, 
and will instead attempt to bring out why controversy abounds in this case, 
and why emotions cannot be treated as straightforwardly as belief and seeing.  
 
Most importantly, I will note that quasi-emotions are said to be imaginative 
counterparts in the sense of being real-world feelings that constitute fictional 
feelings: they are not necessarily subject to the will. This discussion will also 
help to clarify the third claim I want to defend in this chapter: that to justify 
the introduction of a counterpart we have to look at the constraints on being in 
a  genuine  mental  state,  and  the  puzzles  that  arise  from  saying  a  genuine 
mental state is involved in an activity.  
 
In  light  of  this,  we  should  not  assume  a  principle  like  ‘X  is  a  mental  state 
therefore X has an imaginative counterpart’ holds. I will back up this point by 
noting  three  mental  states  that  do  not  appear  to  have  imaginative 
counterparts: understanding, thinking and amusement.  
 
In relation to understanding, I will set out a controversy that arises from Evans 
(1982, p. 344), who introduces what appears to be an imaginative counterpart 
to  understanding,  which  he  calls  ‘quasi-understanding’.  The  introduction  of 
quasi-understanding  is  controversial  but  this  is  for  different  reasons  as 
compared to the introduction of quasi-emotions. The two central issues are 
that introducing quasi-understanding gives us odd conditions for when one 
quasi-understands  something,  and  that  it  deepens  puzzles  related  to  our 
engagement with fiction. This discussion will thus demonstrate a case where 
introducing  an  imaginative  counterpart  is  unwarranted  because  it  deepens 
puzzles rather than makes sense of them. 
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There  are  also  some  mental  states  philosophers  have  not  been  tempted  to 
introduce counterparts to in the first place. I will consider two types of mental 
states that are generally taken to have no imaginative counterpart – thinking 
and amusement – to get clearer on when there is no temptation to introduce 
an imaginative counterpart. 
 
This discussion will bring out my second central claim: that being a real world 
action or feeling that constitutes a fictional action or feeling is not sufficient for 
justifying the introduction of an imaginative counterpart. It is true that we can 
be fictionally amused, but this does not appear to be because of any sort of 
counterpart.  Our  real  amusement  makes  it  the  case  that  we  are  fictionally 
amused. 
 
Having established these three claims and got clearer on the sorts of reasons 
that  have  led  to  philosophers  introducing  and  rejecting  various  imaginative 
counterparts, I will consider whether desire is, prima facie, the sort of mental 
state that should be thought of as having an imaginative counterpart. We will 
do this by looking at whether constraints on genuine desires point towards the 
introduction of a counterpart. 
 
I  will  argue  that  attempting  to  justify  the  introduction  of  a  counterpart  to 
desires in this way will prove problematic, since there is no consensus about 
what the nature of desire is, nor about what constraints are operative on our 
ordinary desires. As such, in line with my third claim, we will have to consider 
what  puzzles  the  introduction  of  an  imaginative  counterpart  to  desire  is 
supposed  to  solve  to  establish  whether  we  are  justified  in  introducing  a 
counterpart to desire. 
 
1.2 Walton on Fictional ‘Truth’ 
 
When  we  engage  with  fictions,  we  often  make  puzzling  statements.  For 
example, when talking about the Harry Potter novels to a friend we might say: 
 
  ‘Harry Potter is a wizard.’ 
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This  statement  is  puzzling  because  we  also  tend  to  accept  the  negative 
existential claim that ‘Harry Potter doesn’t exist’. But, a fortiori, if Harry Potter 
doesn’t exist then ‘he’ cannot be a wizard, since being a wizard entails being a 
concrete particular of some sort. 
 
Thus, if we accept that Harry Potter doesn’t exist, we seem to have to accept 
that the sentence ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ is at best neither true nor false, and 
possibly just false (Friend 2007, p. 143). However, this doesn’t capture the fact 
that  sentences  about  fictional  characters  don’t  always  strike  us  as  merely 
expressing a falsehood or something neither true nor false.1 
 
Walton  (1973,  p.  30)  suggests  that  these  utterances  are  similar  to  the  ones 
children might make when engaging in games of pretence. For example, a child 
who is pretending that three globs of mud in front of him are three pies might 
say: 
 
  ‘There are three pies in front of me.’ 
  ‘I had four pies, but that stupid man stepped on one.’ 
 
Once again these statements, understood literally, appear to be false, or neither 
true nor false. There are no pies in front of the child, and there weren’t four 
pies  in  front  of  the  child  previously.  And,  in  both  the  fiction  case  and  the 
pretence  case,  one  could  also  make  statements  involving  propositional 
attitudes that are similarly puzzling. For example: 
 
  ‘I believe Harry Potter is a wizard.’ 
  ‘I was upset when Dumbledore died.’ 
                                                 
1 Some philosophers respond to this issue by suggesting that fictional characters are 
real,  such  as  Van  Inwagen  (1977)  who  argues  that  they  are  abstract  objects.  For 
present purposes I will set aside discussion of the ontology of fictional characters since 
participants in debates about imaginative counterparts tend to accept that fictional 
characters are not real (e.g. Walton 1990: Ch. 10 and Doggett and Egan 2011, p. 185). 
Furthermore, accepting that fictional characters are abstract objects doesn’t solve all 
the issues raised by utterances like ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’. For example, we still 
have to explain how an abstract object can be a wizard.  14	 ﾠ
  ‘I wanted Snape to escape from Voldermort.’ 
  ‘I believe there are three pies in front of me.’ 
  ‘I was scared that stupid man might step on the other pies.’ 
  ‘I want to eat these pies later.’ 
 
Walton (1973, p. 287) suggests that we should think of these two cases as being 
analogous. In both cases, the odd utterances people make should be thought of 
as being true in fiction. Walton thus introduces the concept of something being 
fictional, or fictionally true. To express that a sentence is fictional he uses the 
notation *P* (it is fictional that P, it is true in fiction that P, it is fictionally true 
that  P,  etc.).  In  other  words,  these  sorts  of  sentences  are  only  meaningful 
within  the  scope  of  our  games  of  pretence.  And,  Walton  argues,  our 
engagements with fictions and the games played by children are both instances 
of engaging in games of pretence. 
 
On this view, when we say that ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ whilst engaging with 
the novel Harry Potter, we pretend that the name ‘Harry Potter’ has a referent, 
and that sentences containing the name can be true. When engaging in such 
pretence,  it  will  therefore  be  fictionally  true  that  Harry  Potter  is  a  wizard 
(*Harry Potter is a wizard*).2 
 
That  being  said,  the  notion  of  ‘pretending’  at  play  here  is  a  special  notion. 
Walton is generally understood as not proposing that we consciously decide to 
pretend that sentences like ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ are true. The sort of game 
we play with the Harry  Potter  novels is supposed to be to some extent an 
automatic response to reading the words of the novels. 
 
We should also note that for Walton fictional truths are only fictional relative 
to a particular fictional ‘world’. *Harry Potter is a wizard* is true relative to the 
world of the Harry Potter novels, but false (or neither true nor false) in other 
fictional worlds. It is not fictionally true that Harry Potter is a wizard in the 
                                                 
2 We should note that the point that we are merely pretending that statements about 
fictional characters are true is crucial for understanding Walton’s approach – fictional 
truths aren’t a species of truth, we pretend that some sentences about fictions are true.  15	 ﾠ
world of Romeo and Juliet. 
 
Nevertheless, whilst this helps us to make sense of statements of ‘fact’ about 
fictions,  we  have  not  yet  got  to  a  position  where  we  can  make  sense  of 
utterances related to our attitudes towards fictive propositions and fictional 
characters, such as ‘I believe that Harry Potter is a wizard’ or ‘I was upset when 
Snape died’. 
 
Walton’s  answer  to  this  problem  is  to  suggest  that  when  we  engage  with 
fictions we create a ‘game world’, which consists of the fiction we are engaging 
with combined with our own responses to the fiction. So, in the game I am 
playing with Harry Potter, I ‘pretend’ that I believe Harry Potter is a wizard, or 
(controversially, as we shall discuss shortly) I pretend that I am upset when 
Snape dies, and this makes it fictionally true that I believe that Harry Potter is 
a wizard, and that I was upset when Snape died (Walton 1978, 1990: Ch. 6). 
 
Having stated the bare bones of Walton’s approach, questions still abound. For 
example, how are fictional truths decided? What makes it fictional that Harry 
Potter is a wizard rather than a pirate? 
 
Walton’s  suggests  that  what  is  fictionally  true  in  a  fiction  is  what  we  are 
prescribed to imagine by said fiction (Walton 1990, p. 39). So for example, the 
Harry Potter novels prescribe imagining that Harry is a wizard, and so it is 
fictionally true that Harry Potter is a wizard. Of course, one could imagine 
otherwise – one could imagine that Harry is a ninja, or a samurai or a pirate, 
etc.,  but  the  novels  do  not  prescribe  these  imaginings,  and  so  even  if  one 
imagines that Harry Potter is a ninja, this will not make it the case that *Harry 
Potter is a ninja*.3 
 
In other words, Walton holds that something can be made fictional in part by 
facts about the actual world and the rules of the game of make-believe we are 
                                                 
3 Or at least, this will not be the case relative to the world of the Harry Potter novels. 
It may be fictionally true that Harry Potter is a ninja relative to a world we create by 
imagining this to be so. 16	 ﾠ
playing.  As  such,  merely  imagining  something  to  be  the  case  is  not  always 
sufficient for making that something fictional. Consider, for example, a game 
where children pretend that tree stumps are bears. If there is a stump near to 
the children that they haven’t noticed, then it remains true that *there is a bear 
nearby*, even though none of the game’s participants are aware of this fictional 
truth (Walton 1990, p. 37). 
 
In this game, participants are prescribed to imagine a bear when they see a 
stump, thus a bear’s presence in the game depends not on whether the children 
playing the game imagine a bear to be present, but on whether a stump is 
present. The children’s awareness, or lack of awareness, of the stumps in their 
vicinity does not impinge on fictional truths about the number of bears nearby 
(though  of  course  their  awareness,  or  lack  thereof,  of  nearby  stumps  will 
generate truths related to what it is fictional that they are aware of). 
 
But whilst what one is prescribed to imagine in games of pretence such as 
bears is usually fairly clear, it is not always so clear how to set out what fictions, 
such as novels, films, and plays, prescribe imagining. For example, Kafka’s The 
Metamorphosis prescribes imagining that Gregor Samsa transforms into some 
sort of bug but it is unclear precisely what bug we should imagine him to have 
transformed into (Friend 2011, p. 183). 
 
We can note in response to such worries that we also sometimes have difficulty 
setting  out  how  we  should  decide  whether  something  is  true  of  the  actual 
world, and this is not usually taken as showing that we simply cannot tell what 
is true or false. Likewise, it looks like we can generally decide between what is 
fictionally true and what is fictionally false – between what we are prescribed 
to imagine and what we are not prescribed to imagine. In practice then, an 
inability to set out clear rules governing what is and isn’t fictional shouldn’t be 
viewed as a problem for Walton’s theory. 
 
Having  set  out  Walton’s  approach  to  understanding  our  engagement  with 
fictions, we can now move on to consider why this approach naturally leads to 
the  introduction  of  some  counterpart  states.  To  begin,  we  will  consider  the 
relatively uncontroversial case of belief-like imaginings to see why we must 17	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introduce them, and how they are said to behave as compared to beliefs. 
 
1.3 Propositional Imaginings 
 
If we accept Walton’s account of fictional truth, the imagination will play a 
central role in our engagement with fictions and children’s pretend play. This is 
because on his account we are said to ‘imagine’, as opposed to believe, it to be 
the case that ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ or that ‘there are three bears in the 
woods’ (Walton 1990, pp. 35-43.) 
 
It  has  been  suggested  that  these  sorts  of  imaginings  are  imaginative 
counterparts  to  belief,  which  Currie  and  Ravenscroft  (2002,  pp.  11-19)  call 
‘belief-like  imaginings’,  and  which  many  philosophers  call  ‘propositional 
imaginings’ (Nichols 2006, pp. 1-2).4  In other words, it has been proposed that 
when we say ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ we imagine this to be so in a belief-like 
way:  we  take  an  attitude  towards  the  proposition  that  is  something  like 
genuinely believing it but that falls short of being a genuine belief. 
 
At this point one might wonder why we need to introduce a belief-like form of 
imagining. Why not just suppose that people have certain kinds of beliefs when 
they engage with fictions, perhaps beliefs that such-and-such is fictional? 
 
The usual answer to this sort of question is that there are functional differences 
between  beliefs  and  propositional  imaginings,  even  though  the  two  mental 
states share some common features. One way of spelling out this idea is by 
noting  that  there  are  several  features  beliefs  and  propositional  imaginings 
appear to share, and several features that only one of the two states exhibit. In 
light of these similarities and differences, it is suggested that the two states 
have a different functional role (Nichols 2004a, p. 130).   
 
                                                 
4 In what follows I will follow this trend and usually refer to belief-like imaginings as 
propositional imaginings. That being said, we should note that Currie and Ravenscroft 
(2002)  use  ‘propositional  imaginings’  to  refer  to  both  belief-like  and  desire-like 
imaginings. 18	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The  first  shared  feature  is  that  both  our  beliefs  and  our  propositional 
imaginings  can  play  an  inferential  role  in  our  reasoning  (Currie  and 
Ravenscroft 2002, pp. 13-15). If one imagines that Harry Potter is a wizard, 
then this will entail that one imagines that Harry Potter has magical powers. A 
similar sort of inference would also hold if one genuinely believed that Harry 
Potter was a wizard.  
 
This sort of inference-preserving role of the propositional imagining is well 
documented by psychological studies of children’s pretend play, and is often 
called ‘mirroring’, in the sense that imaginings mirror the inferential chains of 
beliefs. It has been demonstrated, for example, that if one tells a child that an 
empty cup is filled with tea, and this cup is then upturned, the child will, when 
prompted, express that the cup is now empty (Leslie 1994, p. 224). 
 
It is also often suggested that propositional imaginings have a similar aim to 
beliefs. Beliefs, it tends to be argued, aim at the truth (Railton 1994, pp. 72-75), 
and  it  has  been  argued  that  belief-like  imaginings  likewise  aim  at  what  is 
fictionally  true  (Walton  1990,  p.  41).  Thus,  the  belief/truth  relation  can  be 
thought of as parallel to the imagining/fictional truth relation. 
 
However, even though propositional imaginings are similar to genuine beliefs 
in these sorts of ways, there are still important differences between the two 
mental states. The first key difference between propositional imaginings and 
beliefs is that imaginings are usually quarantined (Gendler 2006, p. 184). That 
is to say, ordinarily propositional imaginings are kept separate from our beliefs 
and so do not tend to play a role in motivating our actions.  
 
This  notion  of  quarantining  leads  us  to  the  second  distinctive  feature  of 
propositional  imaginings  as  compared  to  beliefs:  they  exhibit  what  Walton 
(forthcoming,  pp.  2-3)  calls  ‘clustering’:  propositional  imaginings  typically 
form clusters based on particular worlds, and imaginings in one cluster won’t 
ordinarily  interact  with  others.  For  example,  in  Midnight’s  Children,  it  is 
fictionally true that a character can read minds, yet in War and Peace, it is 
fictionally true that reading minds is impossible. Since these two imaginings 
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people  can  read  minds  and  imagining  that  no  one  can  read  minds.  This 
contrasts with belief, since if you believed P & not-P, this would usually be 
considered irrational. 
 
A  final  difference  between  beliefs  and  belief-like  imaginings  is  that  it  is 
generally agreed that we cannot believe something merely because we choose 
to, whilst we can imagine something in a belief-like way because we choose to:  
we can imagine that-P at will but not believe that-P at will. For example, I can 
choose to propositionally imagine that David Cameron is a lizard, but I cannot 
choose to believe that David Cameron is a lizard. 
 
In light of these differences, it looks like we need to introduce an imaginative 
counterpart to belief. There are constraints on genuine beliefs (e.g. not being 
subject to the will) that are violated in cases involving imaginary things and so 
it looks like we need to introduce an imaginative counterpart to explain what is 
going on in these cases. 
 
But we should not be tempted to stop here and think that belief is the only 
mental state with an imaginative counterpart. Walton (1997, p. 38) notes there 
is more to imagining than merely imagining that things are the case, we can 
also imagine: 
 
‘[D]oing things, experiencing things, feeling in certain ways’ 
 
Before considering whether Walton is right to list ‘feeling in certain ways’ (i.e. 
emotions) in his list of what we can imagine, we will firstly consider another 
widely  accepted  imaginative  counterpart  –  namely  imagining  seeing,  or 
perceptual  imaginings  –  which  is  an  example  of  imagining  experiencing 
something (and also perhaps of doing something).  
 
This discussion will bring out that imagining seeing sometimes behaves in a 
similar  way  to  propositionally  imagining  something  (in  the  sense  of  being 
subject  to  the  will).  However,  there  seem  to  be  two  ways  in  which  we  can 
imagine seeing something. According to Walton (1973, pp. 285-286), we can 
also imagine seeing something in the sense that when we see a painting, we 20	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imagine seeing something, and this sort of counterpart does not appear to be 
subject to the will. 
 
This distinction can be applied to other mental states, such as the emotions, 
and it is important to emphasise that one can hold that one of the two notions 
is  plausible,  and  allows  for  the  introduction  of  an  imaginative  counterpart, 
whilst denying that the other notion is plausible. This is the first central claim 
of this chapter. 
 
1.4 Imagining Seeing and Perceptual Imaginings 
 
The most obvious sense of imagining seeing is the one involved when we form 
a  mental  image  of  something.  When  someone  forms  a  mental  image  of  an 
apple, this seems to have something in common with really seeing an apple, 
but  nevertheless  the  two  activities  appear  importantly  distinct  (McGinn 
2006,p. 7).  
 
This type of imagining seeing is to some extent under the control of the will, 
and thus behaves somewhat similarly to propositional imaginings. However, 
there  is  also  a  notion  of  imagined  seeing  that  is  introduced  in  relation  to 
Walton’s make-believe theory that is not so obviously under the control of the 
will. 
 
Consider  someone  who,  whilst  observing  a  painting,  says  ‘I  can  see  ships 
docked in the harbour’. As Walton (1973, p.   284) notes, this assertion is odd. 
In reality, the observer will be looking at splodges of paint on a canvas, not at 
ships docked in a harbour. One might then move to say that the observer is 
seeing a representation or depiction of ships docked in the harbour. However, 
this in turn will simply raise the question of what it means to see a depiction or 
representation of a ship, and how this relates to genuinely seeing a ship. 
 
Walton’s answer to these sorts of questions is that when looking at a painting, 
we imagine seeing various things. In other words, he thinks that looking at 
paintings is another example of a game of make-believe, and so when looking 
at a painting it can be true that *I see ships docked in the harbour* (Walton 21	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1973, p. 300). This seems to introduce a further sense in which we might think 
seeing has an imaginative counterpart.5 
 
On Walton’s view, when we look at a painting we don’t literally see what it 
depicts, we imagine seeing what it depicts, with this sort of ‘imagined seeing’ 
being an automatic response to seeing the painting. This type of imagining 
seeing differs from the kind related to mental images, since in the painting case 
what we imagine seeing will depend on our real-world actions and the painting 
we are looking at. Walton is proposing that it is made the case that someone 
*sees  ships*  by  virtue  of  them  looking  at  a  canvas,  with  seeing  the  canvas 
doubling in some sense as *seeing ships* (Walton 1973, p. 304).  
 
Walton’s approach here is controversial, and indeed, whether our experience of 
paintings involves the imagination at all is disputed. For present purposes, we 
can set aside worries about whether this account of pictorial representation is 
correct and bring out one salient point. 
 
Walton’s account of imagined seeing demonstrates the first central claim of 
this chapter: that when we talk about imagining-Xing, we could be referring to 
two  distinct  sorts  of  activity.  One  is  where  one  enters  into,  at  will,  an 
imaginative counterpart state (e.g. when forming a mental image or imagining 
that such-and-such is the case), the other where one’s real-world actions or 
feelings (e.g. looking at a canvas), constitutes ‘fictional’ actions or feelings (e.g. 
*seeing ships*).  
 
Accepting  that  one  sense  of  imagining  X-ing  involves  an  imaginative 
counterpart  does  not  mean  you  have  to  accept  that  the  other  involves  an 
imaginative counterpart, nor that the other is even a form of imagining X-ing. 
For example, one could, if they so desired, deny that forming mental images 
                                                 
5 However, as Nanay (2004) notes, pinning down the notion of imagining seeing that 
Walton has in mind is difficult. That being said, it looks like the notion does not boil 
down to merely forming a mental image of what a painting represents, particularly 
since  no  specific  mental  image  is  required  for  one  to  count  as  imagining  seeing 
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should be thought of as involving an imaginative counterpart, whilst accepting 
that one can imagine seeing things in Walton’s sense (and, as would be more 
likely, the reverse of this). 
 
In  other  words,  just  because  we  introduce  an  imaginative  counterpart,  this 
does not necessarily mean we have to introduce one in the sense of a state that 
is under the control of the will. We will now consider how this point affects the 
case for introducing a counterpart to the emotions. 
 
1.5 Emotion and Imagination 
 
The emotions have been of great interest to philosophers who have considered 
our  engagement  with  fictions  and  the  workings  of  the  imagination.  This  is 
because the relationship between our emotions and our imaginings is thought 
to give rise to what is often called the ‘paradox of fiction’. 
 
This  paradox  arises  due  to  the  intuitive  plausibility  of  three  contradictory 
claims (Radford 1975, Walton 1978, Gendler & Kovakovich 2006). The first is 
that we often appear to exhibit emotional responses to works of fiction and 
describe ourselves as such. We speak of  ‘pitying’ Anna Karenina or ‘admiring’ 
Superman, and, when watching horror movies, we often recoil as if we fear the 
on-screen monster(s). 
 
The second claim is that we do not generally believe fictions to be real. As we 
saw in our discussions of fictional truth and propositional imaginings, when we 
engage with fictions, we are best thought of as imagining that there is a person 
called Anna Karenina, a hero called Superman, and so on. 
 
The third claim is that our emotions are subject to a ‘coordination condition’ 
(Gendler  &  Kovakovich  2006,  p.  241).  In  order  to  feel  an  emotion  towards 
something, we ordinarily need to believe that it is real (e.g. it would seem odd if 
I told someone I felt angry because my sister had stolen my hat, when, as a 
matter of fact, I don’t have a sister). This condition conflicts with the first two 
claims, since we know that fictional characters aren’t real, and yet we appear to 
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Philosophers have attempted to solve this paradox by rejecting (or modifying) 
one of the three claims, or by simply accepting the paradox and arguing that 
our emotional responses to fictions are irrational (Radford 1975, pp. 78-79). 
For present purposes, I am going to focus on only one solution to the paradox: 
Walton’s suggestion that we feel quasi-emotions towards fictional characters 
rather than emotions simpliciter (1978, 1990: Chs. 5 and 7), which is a solution 
that seeks to deny the first claim (that we have emotional responses to works of 
fiction). 
 
Walton’s account naturally follows from his make-believe theory of pretence 
and his motivated by an example which runs as follows (Walton 1978, p. 5): 
suppose there is a moviegoer called Charles, who is watching a film about a 
terrible slime that is gobbling up the denizens of London. Having gone on one 
of its many rampages, the slime turns to the camera, raises a single beady eye 
from its mucous body, and fixes its gaze directly on Charles. Charles, upon 
seeing this, yelps, moves back in his seat, clutches his arm rests and shouts 
‘watch out, it's coming!’. After the film, when prompted, Charles also reports 
that he was ‘terrified’ of the slime. 
 
Walton’s starting question is whether we should accept this report at face value 
(Walton 1978, p. 5). On his theory of make-believe, it is clear we have reason to 
be wary of taking Charles’s claim literally. If Charles said after the film, ‘I saw a 
slime’, we would interpret him as saying, *I saw the slime*. Likewise, if he told 
us about the contents of the story in a propositional way (‘That slime attacked 
London’), we would interpret him as referring to his propositional imaginings, 
rather  than  to  his  actual  beliefs.  Walton  suggests  the  case  is  the  same  for 
reports  about  his  emotions:  we  should  interpret  Charles  as  saying,  *I  was 
terrified of the slime* – he is expressing what is fictional and not what is true.  
 
One might propose that in this sort of case Charles fears that *the slime will 
attack* with this also making it true that *Charles fears the slime will attack*. 
As Evans (1980, p. 357) notes, however, it is not clear that we can move from 
*X fears that the slime will attack * to X fears *that the slime will attack *. The 
latter  suggests  that  X  has  a  genuine  fear  of  a  fictional  slime,  whereas  the 
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fear is involved. 
 
Walton (1978, p. 6) proposes that in this case we should indeed introduce such 
a counterpart and say that Charles quasi-fears the slime. However, this is not 
supposed to be an imaginative counterpart along the lines of forming a mental 
image or entertaining a proposition at will. The notion of a ‘quasi-emotion’ is 
more in line with the notion of imagining seeing ships when one looks at a 
painting. As we noted in the previous section, allowing that this is possible 
does not force us to accept that we can have emotion-like imaginings that are 
under the control of the will. 
 
This  distinction  is  essential  to  bear  in  mind,  since  some  philosophers  have 
expressed  scepticism  about  Walton’s  view  precisely  because  they  think  it  is 
hard  to  make  sense  of  ‘imagining  fearing’  something  etc.,  in  the  sense  of 
imagining this at will (Carroll 1990, p. 74). If we can maintain that there is a 
sense of imagining fearing that doesn’t have to be subject to the will, we can 
sidestep this sort of worry (Neill 1993, p. 49). Bearing this in mind, we should 
also note that Walton does not want to make it the case that Charles decides to 
act  as  if  he  were  afraid  of  the  slime.  As  we  noted  earlier,  Walton’s  talk  of 
‘pretend’  should  be  interpreted  as  referring  to  spontaneous  imaginative 
responses, rather than deliberate ones (Walton 1990, pp. 13-16). 
 
The core of Walton’s proposal is that Charles does in fact feel the characteristic 
bodily  changes  that  accompany  an  episode  of  genuine  fear,  but  with  these 
changes  only  constituting  quasi-fear.  This  is  a  case  of  real  world  feelings 
making it fictionally true that such-and-such is the case.  
 
But why think these bodily changes merely constitute quasi-fear? For Walton, 
the reason why these bodily changes fail to constitute genuine fear is because 
of the connection between emotions, beliefs and motivation. He argues that 
genuine fear must coincide with a belief that one is in danger, and must also 
motivate us to perform actions to ameliorate the dangerous situation (Walton 
1978, pp. 6-10). 
 
In  Walton’s  example,  it  is  clear  Charles  does  not  believe  that  the  slime 25	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threatens  his  life.  If  Charles  did  genuinely  fear  imminent  attack  from  a 
rampaging  slime,  then  presumably  he  would  take  steps  to  avoid  this  –  he 
would  hopefully  leave  the  cinema  and  probably  call  the  police,  etc.  Walton 
suggests that ‘fear’ stripped of this sort of motivational role and a belief that 
one is in danger should not be described as genuine fear, and so he finds it 
more appropriate to call it quasi-fear.  
 
Again, this does not mean that Charles has decided to pretend to be scared 
since one cannot simply decide to quasi-fear something. This helps to explain 
why  badly  produced  films,  such  as  the  real  film  The  Green  Slime,  do  not 
manage to produce fear-like responses in their audiences, and why criticisms 
of  Walton’s  position  along  these  lines  won’t  work  (see  Carroll  1991  for  this 
criticism and Walton 1991 for this sort of response). 
 
This point is also demonstrated by some video games aimed at children.6 For 
example, in Nintendo’s Kirby series, the player controls the titular pink avatar 
‘Kirby’, who sucks up enemies and swallows them to absorb their powers. Now, 
in many films and games, characters that eat others can cause fear/quasi-fear. 
However, in these games, no such response is present. It seems intuitive to 
hold that to engender such a response, the games would have to reflect more 
on the terrible fate of those devoured by Kirby. In other words, how a fiction 
presents itself plays an important role in establishing how we respond to it, 
and  this  point  holds  regardless  of  whether  we  fear  or  quasi-fear  fictional 
entities. 
 
That being said, some philosophers remain suspicious of quasi-emotions. For 
example,  one  might  think  that  a  state  being  properly  described  as  ‘fear’ 
                                                 
6 I  am  assuming  here  that  video  games  count  as  fictions.  As  Meskin  and  Robson 
(2012)  argue,  video  games  seem  to  count  as  fictions  in  Walton’s  sense,  though 
Walton’s definition of fiction in terms of prescriptions to imagine is remarkably broad 
and does not neatly coincide with our everyday use of the word ‘fiction’. This leads 
Friend (2008, p. 154) to coin the term ‘Walt-fiction’ for the class that Walton calls 
‘fiction’. That being said, I think that our everyday use of the word ‘fiction’ also allows 
for  video  games  to  count  as  works  of  fiction  –  at  the  very  least  they  tend  to  be 
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depends  not  on  the  subject’s  beliefs,  but  on  the  physiological  reactions 
occurring  in  his  body,  a  position  associated  with  James  (1884),  and  more 
recently Prinz (2004). If this sort of account of the emotions is correct, then 
quasi-emotions may well count as genuine emotions by definition. 
 
However, even if one is sceptical about whether we need to introduce quasi-
emotions on the basis of constraints on feeling a genuine emotion, there do 
seem to be many puzzling aspects to our emotional engagement with fiction, 
and children’s emotional responses to their games of pretence (e.g. why do we 
choose to engage with fictions that we know will ‘frighten’ us?). A philosopher 
who sticks with genuine emotions will still need to make sense of these puzzles. 
 
To make a broader point, we should note that when determining whether to 
introduce an imaginative counterpart, we must consider whether it helps to 
make sense of puzzles related to the functioning of the imagination, or whether 
it simply creates new problems and exacerbates existing ones. 
 
This  allows  us  to  clarify  the  first  and  third  main  claims  of  this  chapter.  In 
relation  to  the  first  claim,  we  have  once  again  seen  that  accepting  that  an 
imaginative counterpart to a mental state exists doesn’t commit us to accepting 
that we can entertain said counterpart at will: an imaginative counterpart can 
also  be  introduced  when  real  world  feelings  or  actions  constitute  fictional 
feelings or actions.  
 
In relation to the third claim, we have seen that when considering whether to 
introduce  a  counterpart  we  should  bear  in  mind  what  puzzling  cases  the 
counterpart is meant to make sense of, and we should pay attention to the 
constraints that ought to be placed on being in a mental state to see if they 
force us to introduce an imaginative counterpart (e.g. it looks like fear might 
require a belief that the object of our fear exists, and this is violated in the 
fiction case). 
 
So  far  we  have  seen  that  several  imaginative  counterparts  can  plausibly  be 
introduced, but we should not begin our discussion of desire by presuming that 
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holds. In the next two sections, we will consider three mental states that do not 
appear  to  have  imaginative  counterparts:  understanding  in  section  1.6,  and 
thinking and amusement in section 1.7.  
 
In relation to understanding, quasi-understanding is a proposed imaginative 
counterpart that has proven controversial. Consideration of why this is so will 
demonstrate how the introduction of a counterpart might be thought to deepen 
puzzles related to our engagement with fictions. This will allow us to clarify the 
third claim of this chapter. 
 
Having seen why we should resist the introduction of quasi-understanding, we 
will then move on to consider thinking and amusement to bring out why in 
these cases philosophers have not been tempted to introduce an imaginative 
counterpart.  The  upshot  of  this  discussion  will  be  that  thinking  and 
amusement can both have an imaginary thing as their intentional object. This 
will  allow  us  to  defend  the  second  key  claim  of  this  chapter:  noting  a  case 
where a real-world action or feeling constitutes a fictional action or feeling is 
not sufficient for justifying the introduction of an imaginative counterpart. 
 
1.6 Quasi-Understanding 
 
Evans  (1982,  p.  344)  appears  to  introduce  quasi-understanding  –  a 
counterpart  state  to  genuine  understanding  that  one  is  in  when  one 
reads/hears utterances occurring in works of fiction, or names that appear to 
‘refer’ to fictional characters – as a way of avoiding difficulties his approach to 
names and meaning faces when considering sentences found within works of 
fiction. 
 
If,  as  Evans  holds,  understanding  a  sentence  involves  knowing  its  truth 
conditions, and understanding a proper name involves knowing the bearer of 
the  name,  then  genuine  understanding  will  be  impossible  in  the  case  of 
fictional names and utterances. Since fictional names do not have bearers, and 
fictional utterances do not have truth conditions, it seems to follow that we 
cannot  understand  such  names  and  utterances.  He  thus  proposes  that  we 
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introducing a counterpart here involves both strategies I noted in my third 
claim:  noting  constraints  on  genuine  understanding,  and  noting  a  puzzling 
case where understanding seems to be involved However, the problem with 
introducing this sort of counterpart is that it serves to deepen the mysteries 
related to our engagement with fictions (Sainsbury 1999, pp. 252-257). This is 
for at least three reasons. 
 
Firstly,  we  don’t  ordinarily  question  whether  we  can  genuinely  understand 
sentences about fictions. This contrasts with the quasi-emotion case – though 
the introduction of quasi-emotions is controversial, questions about how we 
can feel pity for someone who doesn’t exist, and why our fear of fictional slimes 
doesn’t make us flee the cinema, are questions thoughtful observers of fiction 
might entertain. That is to say, that even if one rejects quasi-emotions, we still 
have to make sense of these puzzles.  
 
Sainsbury  (1999,  p.  254)  develops  this  issue  by  noting  that  our  ‘emotional’ 
responses to fictions differ from paradigm emotional responses. Conversely, 
the  sort  of  understanding  involved  with  reading/hearing  utterances  about 
fictional characters appears to behave in the same way as paradigm cases of 
understanding. In light of this, it is not so clear that we must introduce quasi-
understanding to deal with these sorts of cases, unless one is starting from a 
position where one is concerned with the truth conditions of sentences about 
fictions. Thus, the onus is on the one who introduces quasi-understanding to 
show us we require its introduction by defending the constraints they have 
placed on genuine understanding. 
 
The second difficulty is that the notion of quasi-understanding introduces an 
odd  disconnect  between  the  state  someone  is  in  and  their  awareness  of 
whether the fiction they are engaging with is real or not. In the case of the 
emotions, if one thought the slime bearing down on them was real, and then 
discovered it was merely fictional, it is likely that they would cease to genuinely 
fear the slime upon coming to this realisation. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  case  of  quasi-understanding  it  appears  that  if 
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learn  of  its  fictional  status,  they  would  not  move  from  understanding  the 
utterance  to  quasi-understanding  the  utterance:  they  would  learn  they  only 
quasi-understood the utterance all along. This is because whether an utterance 
is  understood  or  quasi-understood  appears  to  depend  not  on  whether  the 
reader knows the sentence is fictional, but on whether the sentence is in fact 
fictional. On the other hand, whether one feels a real or quasi-emotion will 
depend on whether they are aware that the fiction they are engaging with is 
fictional. 
 
Now, one might think this consequence is acceptable if one holds that whether 
the hearer of an utterance understands it depends on external factors, but we 
also face a question as to where to draw the line between understanding and 
quasi-understanding.  
 
For example, many fictions contain statements of fact, or statements that are 
partly  factual  and  partly  fictional,  such  as  sentences  about  real  places,  but 
which make reference to fictional persons who live there. Do we understand 
the parts about real locations or merely quasi-understand them? Likewise, if a 
fiction mentions a real street, and a non-existent house on the street, do we 
only  quasi-understand  where  the  house  is  located?  If  we  propose  that  we 
straightforwardly understand fictional sentences, it is easier to make sense of 
these sorts of cases. 
 
A final issue concerns setting out what it would mean to quasi-understand a 
sentence. As we noted earlier, Evans is working with the sort of model where to 
understand what is meant by a sentence such as ‘snow is white’ is to know that 
this sentence is true if the thing denoted by ‘snow’ has the property designated 
by ‘is white’ (Davidson 1967). 
 
Sainsbury (1999, p. 256) suggests that to account for how quasi-understanding 
is similar to genuine understanding we might employ a principle of the form: 
 
‘If F(s has truth conditions) (the fiction has it that s has truth conditions) 
then s is capable of being quasi-understood.’ 
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However, Sainsbury notes this approach won’t work because we might have a 
case where a fiction says something like: ‘Alice came to the dragon’s cave, and 
said the magic formula the friendly genie had given her, and which no human 
ear could understand: “erty up asd”. The dragon heard and realised that he was 
not to attack Alice.’ (Sainsbury 1999, p. 256). 
 
In this case, ‘erty up asd’ will have truth conditions in the fiction, and indeed, it 
is part of the pretence that dragons can understand this sentence, but this does 
not mean that a reader will be able to ‘quasi-understand’ this sentence (nor can 
they  understand  it).  Why  this  is  so  can  be  explained  if  one  denies  the 
possibility  of  quasi-understanding  something.  If  understanding  behaves  the 
same  way  in  real  life  and  in  fiction,  then  we  will  fail  to  understand 
gobbledygook when it appears in fiction as we would in real life. 
 
With the introduction of quasi-understanding, this issue is harder to deal with 
since the defender of quasi-understanding will have to find a way of cashing 
out the notion that shows it to be similar to genuine understanding but avoids 
entailing that we should understand any sentence that has truth conditions 
within the scope of a fiction. 
 
Bearing  these  issues  in  mind  it  seems  we  should  resist  the  introduction  of 
quasi-understanding. However, this case has helped to clarify our third central 
claim  by  giving  us  an  example  of  a  counterpart  that  serves  to  only  deepen 
puzzles related to our engagement with fiction, even though one might hold 
that we can identify constraints on genuine understanding. To deal with this 
sort of case, it looks like the solution is to develop a more nuanced account of 
understanding, rather than introducing a counterpart to understanding. 
 
Before applying these considerations to desire, we will discuss thinking and 
amusement,  since  these  two  mental  states  do  not  appear  to  have  an 
imaginative counterpart and philosophers have not been tempted to introduce 
one. This will help to bring out the reasons we have for denying that a given 
mental state has an imaginative counterpart, and will allow us to clarify the 
second main claim of this chapter. 
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1.7 Thinking & Amusement 
 
To begin, we should consider why thinking, in the sense of ‘thinking about P’, 
does  not  have  an  imaginative  counterpart.  A  common  intuition,  recently 
defended by Crane (2013: Ch. 1), is that a thought can have something that 
doesn’t exist as its intentional object: we can think about things that exist, like 
David Cameron, and things that don’t exist, like Pegasus.  
 
One might maintain that it’s odd to suppose that we can think about things 
that don’t exist, perhaps because thinking about something must involve some 
sort of real relation between the thought and the object being thought about. 
That  being  said,  proposing  that  we  can  ‘something-like-think’  about  non-
existent things does not resolve the worry here: we can still question why we 
can ‘something-like-think’ about things that don’t exist. In other words, the 
introduction of a counterpart here would not help to solve puzzles about the 
nature of thinking. 
 
Furthermore, it is also hard to see what the difference between thinking and 
thinking-like imagining would consist in. If one allowed that we could have 
thinking-like imaginings about Harry Potter, but denied we could think about 
Harry Potter, this would be puzzling, since it looks like having thinking-like 
imaginings about Harry Potter will entail thinking about Harry Potter in some 
sense. It is made true that someone is thinking about something by their mere 
act of thinking about something, and thinking-like imaginings, whatever they 
might be, would also constitute thinking about something.  
 
Or, to put the point in terms of my third claim, there are no constraints on 
what it takes to count as ‘thinking about something’ that force us to introduce 
an  imaginative  counterpart  to  thinking.  So,  we  have  an  example  here  of  a 
mental state where there are no obvious constraints on being in said mental 
state that drive us towards introducing an imaginative counterpart, nor any 
puzzles that are solved by introducing a counterpart.  
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have an imaginative counterpart: amusement7. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002, 
pp. 189-190) note that we ordinarily take it to be the case that fictional things 
can be the intentional objects of our amusement (e.g. we can be amused by 
Bugs  Bunny)  and  that  we  also  allow  that  we  can  be  amused  by  things  we 
imagine (e.g. we can be amused by the contents of a daydream).  
 
As such, it looks like we do not need to introduce an imaginative counterpart to 
amusement. Unlike the case of emotions like fear, we do not feel an obvious 
pressure to resist the suggestion that we can be genuinely amused by fictional 
things,  since  something  known  to  be  fictional  being  the  object  of  your 
amusement doesn’t appear to be problematic, and prima facie, there are no 
constraints on amusement that force the introduction of a counterpart. 
 
Indeed, drawing on Walton (1994, pp. 48-49), we can note that it is unclear 
what  being  ‘quasi-amused’  would  involve.  For  example,  we  can  imagine 
ourselves being amused by something, but this seems to be forming a belief-
like  imagining  that  you  are  amused,  rather  than  an  imagining  with 
amusement-like character. And, since it appears the contents of daydreams can 
amuse us, imagining something amusing then feeling amused appears to be a 
case  of  being  amused  by  something  you  imagine,  not  an  example  of 
amusement-like imagining. 
 
Of course, it might be fictionally true that one is amused on Walton’s account 
of our engagement with fiction. When watching Looney Tunes it will be true 
that  *I  am  amused*,  but  this  will  be  because  I  am  actually  amused  by 
something fictional (it will be true that I am amused by *P*), not because I am 
in a state of quasi-amusement. This contrast with emotions like fear, where it is 
usually the case that *I am scared of P* is true but I am scared that *P* is false. 
This brings out the second central claim of this chapter: noting a case where a 
                                                 
7 One might think amusement is another example of an emotion, and that it should 
have been treated in our discussion of quasi-emotions. However, Walton does not have 
to be taken as claiming that all emotions have an imaginative counterpart, so even if 
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real world action or feeling constitutes a fictional action or feeling does not 
provide sufficient justification for introducing an imaginative counterpart.  
 
However, the case for denying that amusement has an imaginative counterpart 
may not be as clear as Currie and Ravenscroft suppose. Imagine a situation 
where a friend is telling you an anecdote about their sister, who is somewhat 
eccentric and always wears socks on her hands but walks around barefoot. One 
day, he tells you he jokingly asked his sister why she doesn’t put gloves on her 
feet and she responded with a curt ‘because that would just be weird’. You 
might  be  amused  by  this  anecdote  and  proceed  to  laugh.  As  such,  we  can 
describe this as an example of being amused by your friend’s sister. 
 
Now, suppose your friend informs you that in fact he does not have a sister: the 
anecdote was entirely fictional. This seems to put pressure on the suggestion 
that his sister amused you. How could his sister have amused you when she 
doesn’t even exist?8 
 
An initial response we could offer here would be to suggest that his sister never 
amused you in the first place; perhaps you were amused by the story about her. 
In other words, we can propose that the object of your amusement wasn’t the 
(non-existent) sister but the anecdote itself. For example, we could note that 
you might have responded to the anecdote by saying ‘that was a funny story!’ 
or words to that effect. However, this simplifies the case – you also might have 
responded by saying ‘your sister sounds hilarious!', making it sound as if she 
were indeed the object of your amusement. 
 
There are at least two further responses one can give to this case to maintain 
that we have no reason to introduce an imaginative counterpart to amusement. 
The  first  is  to  note  that  ‘X  amuses  Y’  or  ‘X  is  amused  by  Y’  is  ambiguous 
between  an  intentional  and  causal  reading.  We  might  mean  that  X’s 
amusement has Y as its intentional object, or we might be suggesting that Y 
causes  X’s  amusement.  The  second  is  to  note  that  it  is  unclear  whether  an 
example like this ought to lead us to introduce ‘quasi-amusement’ in the way 
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similar examples are thought to motivate quasi-fear etc. This is because there 
are several discontinuities between this case and the examples that motivate 
the introduction of quasi-emotions like quasi-fear. 
 
Before we push this second response, we should consider how to construct a 
response  to  this  case  based  on  the  distinction  between  the  causal  and 
intentional  sense  of  being  amused  by  something.  As  we  already  noted,  the 
suggestion  that  a  state  of  amusement  can  have  a  non-existent  thing  as  its 
intentional object doesn’t appear to be obviously problematic. We generally 
take it that our amusement can have Bugs Bunny and other fictional entities as 
its intentional object, and we do not as of yet have a reason why we ought to 
reject this intuitive idea.  
 
In the case of fear, we resist this suggestion because it seems being a genuine 
object  of  fear  requires  you  to  believe  the  object  exists:  we  think  there  is 
something strange about holding that X fears something that is known to be 
non-existent. On the other hand, in the case of amusement it seems something 
can be the object of our amusement regardless of whether we believe it is real 
or not: we do not take it as strange to hold that X is amused by something 
known to be non-existent. 
 
However,  we  face  a  problem  when  we  consider  the  causal  notion  of  being 
amused by something, and this notion is perhaps implicit in the example of the 
made-up sister. To be the cause of a state of amusement, it appears an object 
must have some sort of link to reality. There is something puzzling about the 
idea of someone’s non-existent sister causing you to be amused. This involves 
a real causal relation, and is ruled out in the same way that someone’s non-
existent sister cannot tickle you. 
 
However, we can respond to this worry by returning to the distinction between 
being amused by a story and being amused by a character. In the present case, 
we could suggest that your amusement was caused by the story itself, even 
though your amusement had the sister as its intentional object. Indeed, we 
could make a similar suggestion to explain other cases where one is amused by 
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amusement  is  caused  by  a  known  to  be  non-existent  character  like  Bugs 
Bunny.  
 
We can thus propose that in general when a non-existent thing amuses us, this 
amusement is caused by a fiction, but still has the non-existent thing as its 
intentional object. To justify the introduction of an imaginative counterpart, 
we would have to find a reason to deny that a state of amusement can have a 
non-existent thing as its intentional object. But, as we noted, it is not clear that 
amusement should be subject to this sort of constraint. 
 
We can back up this worry by returning to the second sort of response we can 
make, noting the discontinuities between this case and the case of emotions 
like fear. In the fear case, we noted that it seems odd to describe someone as 
scared by something they know to be non-existent. This is due to the fact that a 
non-existent  thing  being  the  intentional  object  of  an  episode  of  fear  seems 
puzzling,  and  because  of  the  constraints  on  fear  related  to  motivation  and 
belief.  
 
With amusement it’s trickier to make this sort of case for a counterpart because 
there is no clear motivational role associated with amusement, nor any belief-
based constraints. Indeed, if, after revealing that his sister was made up, your 
friend proceeded to tell you further tales about her fictional misadventures you 
might  still  be  amused,  and  it  is  not  clear  why  we  should  hold  that  this 
‘amusement’ differs from the amusement you would have if his sister were real. 
 
This point can be reinforced by noting what would happen to your ‘fear’ as 
compared  to  your  ‘amusement’  in  a  case  where  you  went  from  believing 
something was fictional to realising it was real. Suppose you are sitting in a 
cinema in London and think you are watching a fictional green slime attack the 
denizens of the street situated just outside the cinema. In this sort of case, you 
will feel quasi-fear and yelp whilst refraining from calling the police or running 
(and so on). But suppose you realise that in fact you are not currently being 
presented with a work of fiction. There really is a green slime attacking the 
street just outside the cinema (perhaps the cinema screen was linked up to a 
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a marked change in your actions and you will probably attempt to flee the 
cinema. 
 
In the amusement case this sort of change will not occur. If you are amused by 
what you thought was a fictional tale about two clumsy individuals and then 
realise the individuals are real, it seems you can continue to be amused by 
them, and it doesn’t look like your actions or behaviour will necessarily change. 
That being said, the case may not be so simple here. For example, suppose 
Sacha  Baron  Cohen’s  character  Borat  were  a  real  individual  rather  than  a 
fictional one. If you thought he was a fictional character you might laugh at his 
comments, but upon realising he genuinely held said views you would probably 
not be amused by his overt sexism and racism. 
 
However, in this case it is not that you would move from being quasi-amused 
to amused, as the cinemagoer went from quasi-fear to fear, you would simply 
cease to be amused. This suggests that an explanation of this sort of case will 
involve looking into why we find certain things funny, fictional or otherwise, 
and  will  not  be  explained  by  introducing  an  imaginative  counterpart  to 
amusement. 
 
As such, we can make sense of the sister case by noting the distinction between 
being the cause of an episode of amusement and being the intentional object of 
an episode of amusement, and by noting that it is unclear what the difference is 
supposed to be between being amused by something real and being amused by 
something fictional. 
 
Thus, we now have two examples of mental states that do not have imaginative 
counterparts.  There are no clear constraints on amusement and thinking that 
necessitate  the  introduction  of  counterparts,  and  the  introduction  of 
counterparts does not appear to be necessary to solve puzzles. 
 
To conclude this chapter, we can now turn our attention to desire and, in line 
with my third claim, consider whether there are any constraints on desires that 
necessitate the introduction of an imaginative counterpart I will argue that the 
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determine whether there is a need to introduce an imaginative counterpart to 
desire we will have to look at cases where said counterpart is said to resolve 
puzzles. 
 
1.8 Imaginary Desires 
 
As  my  first  claim  notes,  there  are  at  least  two  notions  of  imaginative 
counterparts: one’s like propositional imaginings that are under the control of 
the will, and those like quasi-emotions that are not. With desire, it seems an 
initial point to make is that it is harder to defend the introduction of imaginary 
desires that one can entertain at will. 
 
For example, Goldie (2005, pp. 132-133) notes it is difficult to make sense of 
how  one  can  imagine  desiring  a  mud  pie  if  one  does  not  find  mud  pies 
desirable  in  reality.  Perhaps  we  can  imagine  something  we  actually  find 
desirable (like an apple pie) and then imagine having similar feelings about a 
mud  pie,  but  this  doesn’t  appear  to  be  quite  the  same  imaginative  act  as 
imagining desiring a mud pie, i.e. having an imaginary desire directed at the 
pies muddy contents and dirty crust, and desiring it because it possesses these 
properties. 
 
Likewise, it is also unclear how to imagine desiring to perform morally deviant 
actions, like murders. For example, it will not do to simply imagine the sort of 
actions  these  desires  might  lead  us  to,  nor  to  imagine  that  we  have  such 
desires. The former merely involves imagining acting in certain ways, and the 
latter merely involves imagining in a belief-like way having a certain desire, not 
imagining desiring something. 
 
However, this only demonstrates that we may not be able to imagine desiring X 
when we don’t actually desire X. This point doesn’t count against an ability to 
imagine desiring X if one does actually desire X. For example, one might hold 
that we can imagine desiring things we don’t currently desire but might desire 
in  the  future,  like  imagining  desiring  a  chocolate  cake  when  we  don’t  feel 
hungry enough to actually eat one. That being said, these sorts of cases may 
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imagine desiring things, similar to how in the amusement case it looked like we 
could be amused by what we imagined but it wasn’t clear that we could be 
imaginarily amused. 
 
However, even if an imaginative counterpart to desire entirely subject to the 
will may be unappealing, there is still the possibility of a form of ‘imaginary 
desires’ that behaves more like quasi-emotions, where real world feelings or 
actions  constitute  having  a  fictional  desire.  Before  we  consider  how  such  a 
counterpart might behave and how we might justify its introduction, we should 
firstly note an initial worry with introducing a desire-like form of imagining, 
which applies to both desire-like imaginings that resemble quasi-emotions and 
ones that resemble propositional imaginings. 
 
We can bring out this worry by noting that our desires are often said to have a 
‘world  to  mind’  fit.  Roughly,  we  want  the  world  to  conform  to  our  desires. 
Beliefs, on the other hand, are usually said to have a ‘mind to world’ fit. Our 
beliefs aim at truth, and reflect how the world is in fact. Our desires reflect how 
we want the world to be. 
 
As we discussed in section 1.3, part of the need for belief-like imaginings is to 
allow for states like belief that do not fit the world in a strict sense. With desire, 
the case is trickier, since we will often desire for the world to be a way that it is 
not  at  present.  It  is  therefore  unclear  whether  we  need  to  introduce  an 
imaginative counterpart to desire, since we already allow in some sense for 
desires to relate to things that are not ‘real’. 
 
Another way of putting this point is that, as in the case of amusement, it is not 
clear that we can distinguish between I want9 *P* and *I want P*. The first can 
be read as: ‘I want it to be the case that P is fictionally true’, the second as ‘it is 
fictionally true that I want P’. In both cases, it looks like P being fictionally true 
will satisfy the desire. Desires reflect what we want to true of the world and in 
both cases the desire we have cited appears to call for the same state of affairs 
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to  obtain.  Furthermore,  it  is  unclear  why  we  should  hold  that  we  can’t 
genuinely desire that *P*, since it looks like desires can have something non-
existent as their intentional object, since, as we just noted, desires will often 
relate to states of affairs we want to obtain, not states of affairs that do obtain.  
 
Moving  on  from  this  initial  worry,  we  should  now  consider  how  imaginary 
desires, even when not under the control of the will, might behave, and what 
constraints  should  be  placed  on  genuine  desires.  To  do  this,  we  should 
consider  how  to  define  desire.  Two  common  approaches  to  defining  desire 
involve noting the motivational role of desire (Smith 1987) and the relation 
between pleasure and desire (Strawson 1994). 
 
On the first approach, we might say that to desire something is to be motivated 
to perform actions that will bring about that something. In other words, to use 
Schroeder’s (2009) formulation of this position, which is associated with Smith 
(1987): 
 
‘For an organism to desire P is for the organism to be disposed to act so 
as to bring about P’ 
 
This is sometimes called the ‘Humean’ view of motivation, which holds that all 
actions are motivated by desires, and that desires are essentially motivating. 
However,  both  these  claims  have  been  viewed  as  problematic.  In  the  first 
instance, one might hold that things other than desires can motivate us, for 
example reflexes, or other conative attitudes like hopes. 
 
Moreover, in relation to the second tenet of the Humean picture, it seems that 
not  all  desires  are  essentially  motivational.  Mele  (1995,  p.  394)  gives  the 
example of a desire that your friend’s plane leave on time (with you forming 
this desire after the time was plane was supposed to leave). That being said, a 
proponent of the Humean view can respond to this sort of case by proposing 
that with such desires if you could  perform an action that led to the event 
occurring, you would. 
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still  consider  how  an  imaginative  counterpart  to  desire  would  behave  if  we 
accepted that desires were motivational. If one thinks this is the correct picture 
of desire, then when asking whether desire has an imaginative counterpart, we 
can be interpreted as asking one of two things. We might be asking whether 
there are mental states that are ‘quasi-motivational’ (i.e. that motivate us, just 
not in quite the same way as our ordinary desires), or we might be asking 
whether there are mental states that fail to motivate us but still seem to be 
similar to desires. 
 
Both these approaches are problematic. With the first option, it is unclear what 
would  constitute  quasi-motivation.  Presumably,  being  motivated  to  do 
something simply entails being disposed to perform actions to bring about that 
something: it is unclear what sort of example would involve performing an 
action that is only quasi-motivated. 
 
The  second  sort  of  approach  is  also  puzzling,  since  we  are  setting  out  the 
nature  of  desire  in  terms  of  its  motivational  role  it  is  unclear  why  a  state 
stripped of this role could be properly described as desire-like. With belief and 
its counterpart, we could note the way both states preserve inferences, etc., to 
set out how the two were similar, but on the present picture of desire we do not 
have these sorts of features to refer to. This is because we have said nothing 
about  how  desires  behave  beyond  the  fact  that  they  dispose  us  to  perform 
actions to bring about their satisfaction. 
 
Since the relation between desire and motivation is unclear, we might instead 
propose  that  desire  is  essentially  connected  to  pleasure.  On  this  view 
associated with Strawson (1994) (using a formulation from Schroeder (2009)): 
 
‘For an organism to desire P is for the organism to be disposed to take 
pleasure in it seeming that P and displeasure in it seeming that not-P’ 
 
Intuitively, this idea is plausible since, as we just noted, some desires do not 
appear to have an obvious motivational role. For example, one might desire 
world peace, but not take any active steps towards achieving this goal. On the 
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agent will feel pleasure upon learning of the peaceful world he now resides in.  
However, this view of the nature of desire is not without its critics. For one 
thing,  it  is  unclear  whether  someone  experiencing  pleasure  upon  a  state  of 
affairs  obtaining  always  means  that  they  desired  said  state  of  affairs., 
Schroeder (2004, pp. 31-32) gives the example of a depressed man who feels 
no pleasure when his children are successful, but still attests to desiring their 
success. 
 
If this account of desire is correct, then the present question about whether 
desire has an imaginative counterpart becomes very different. Now, we need to 
ask whether there is a state that is ‘quasi-pleasurable’, or whether there are 
mental states that are similar to desires but do not cause us to feel pleasure 
upon their satisfaction. 
 
In  the  first  instance,  it  strikes  me  that  the  idea  of  something  being  quasi-
pleasurable is puzzling. Pleasure appears similar to amusement in there being 
no  obvious  sense  in  which  it  could  have  an  imaginative  counterpart.  For 
example, if one imagines something they find pleasurable, it is hard to see why 
this would lead to them feeling quasi-pleasure as opposed to simply pleasure 
(Moran  1994,  pp.  93-94).  Indeed,  if  one  has  a  feeling  of  pleasure  when 
engaging with a fiction, it is hard to see when this feeling should be properly 
described  as  merely  quasi-pleasure,  since  it  looks  like  pleasure  can  have 
something fictional as its intentional object, and can be caused by works of 
fiction. 
 
In the second instance, if one thinks that what distinguishes desire-like states 
from genuine desires is that desire-like states do not lead us to feel pleasure 
upon  their  satisfaction,  then  it  is  unclear  in  what  sense  such  states  can  be 
properly described as desire-like. 
 
These difficulties with attempting to define the core feature of desire may be 
because,  as  Martin  (unpublished,  pp.  30-31)  suggests,  there  are  numerous 
mental states that the word ‘desire’ picks out, or it may be that desires have 
multiple  ‘faces’,  and  that  our  various  desires  reflect  these  faces  to  differing 
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Bearing  this  in  mind,  a  final  approach  to  justifying  the  introduction  of  an 
imaginative counterpart to desire would be to give a complex account of desire, 
which suggests that some (or all) of the elements we have discussed should be 
part of our account. On this sort of cluster view, we might attempt to give a 
functional definition of desire by holding that desires are mental states that 
relate  to  pleasure,  motivation,  our  preferences,  and  perhaps  have  a  certain 
phenomenology etc. 
 
In turn, we can then propose that desire-like imaginings are mental states that 
lack  one  or  more  of  these  features  and  are  thus  similar  to  desires  but  still 
distinct in terms of functional role. In other words, we can take the approach 
used  to  introduce  an  imaginative  counterpart  to  belief  to  justify  the 
introduction of desire-like imaginings. 
 
However, the way to do this will not be as clear-cut as in the belief case. In the 
belief case philosophers agree that there are features beliefs and propositional 
imaginings  tend  to  share  (e.g.  the  way  they  preserve  inferential  links)  and 
features they don’t tend to share (e.g. propositional imaginings being subject to 
the  will).  With  desires  and  desire-like  imaginings  the  case  will  be  more 
complex.  
 
In mindreading, for example, desire-like imaginings are supposed to be unlike 
desires in that they don’t motivate us, and this is also supposed to be the case 
for  the  desire-like  imaginings  that  are  involved  in  our  engagement  with 
fictions.  However,  in  the  pretend  play  case,  desire-like  imaginings  are 
supposed to motivate children to perform various actions.  
 
As such, the story cannot be as simple as saying ‘desire-like imaginings share 
all the features of desire except for X’ since the feature (or features) they are 
meant to lack will differ in each activity that they are supposed to play a role in. 
This  will  in  turn  make  it  difficult  to  draw  the  line  between  a  desire-like 
imagining  and  a  desire  that  lacks  a  certain  feature  (e.g.  a  desire  with  no 
motivational role and a desire that is really a desire-like imagining because it 
doesn’t motivate us). 
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The key point to take from this starting discussion, is that attempting to set 
specific constraints on what a desire is and how they behave cannot neatly 
force the introduction of an imaginative counterpart to desire independently of 
considering  problem  cases,  since  it  is  unclear  what  constraints  ought  to  be 
placed on our desires. Over the next two chapters, my primary focus will thus 
be  on  whether  the  introduction  of  desire-like  imaginings  helps  us  to  make 
sense of puzzles that arise when we suppose that genuine desires are involved 
in  imagination-based  activities  like  pretend  play  and  our  engagement  with 
fictions. 
 
1.9 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have seen that philosophers have typically accepted that 
some mental states have imaginative counterparts, but how these counterparts 
are supposed to behave, and which states have counterparts, are controversial 
issues.  We  have  also  established  three  claims  that  allow  us  to  adjudicate 
whether desire has an imaginative counterpart. 
 
Imaginative counterparts to belief and seeing are typically accepted, and fit 
what  we  might  think  of  as  the  ‘standard’  conception  of  an  imaginative 
counterpart in that they are both subject to the will. In other cases, such as 
quasi-emotions, this link to the will is severed and we are said to end up in 
these counterpart states in a more automatic way, and cannot enter into said 
states  at  will.  That  there  are  these  two  sorts  of  counterparts  was  the  first 
central claim of this chapter. 
 
By  considering  understanding,  thinking  and  amusement,  we  also  saw  that 
some mental states do not appear to have imaginative counterparts and that 
we should not presume a principle like ‘X is a mental state therefore X has an 
imaginative counterpart’ is valid. And, we saw that it being made fictional that 
one is in a mental state by a real world behaviour is not sufficient to ground the 
introduction of an imaginative counterpart, the second central claim of this 
chapter. 
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behave, we have seen that it is unclear what constraints are operative on our 
ordinary desires. In line with the third central claim of this chapter, this rules 
out introducing a counterpart to desire based solely on noting constraints on 
desiring  and  we  will  have  to  focus  on  puzzling  cases  where  desire  and 
imagination appear to interact to establish whether desire has an imaginative 
counterpart.  As  such,  we  will  now  consider  the  first  two  problem  cases  – 
mindreading and pretend play – to see whether introducing an imaginative 
counterpart to desire in these cases helps to resolve puzzling aspects of these 
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Chapter 2: Mindreading and Pretend Play 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Having seen that attempting to place constraints on desires is unlikely to prove 
fruitful in settling debates about the existence of desire-like imaginings, we can 
now turn to consider two specific problem cases that have been suggested by 
philosophers to necessitate the introduction of an imaginative counterpart to 
desire: mindreading and pretend play. 
 
In  the  case  of  mindreading,  simulation  theorists  like  Gordon  (1986)  and 
Goldman (1989) have argued that in order to predict and explain the actions of 
others  we  must  simulate  their  mental  states,  specifically  their  beliefs  and 
desires. As such, a notion of simulated beliefs and simulated desires has been 
introduced to make sense of mindreading, and philosophers such as Currie 
(1995, pp. 157-160) have suggested that these simulated beliefs and desires are 
in fact belief-like imaginings and desire-like imaginings. 
 
I will argue that the introduction of simulated desires is problematic, since 
these desire-like states appear to be non-motivational and entirely subject to 
the  will,  which  is  puzzling  from  a  phenomenological  perspective,  and  also 
entails  that  simulated  desires  are  distinct  from  the  counterpart  involved  in 
pretend play and our engagement with fictions. We thus cannot justify their 
introduction  in  the  mindreading  case  on  the  grounds  that  desire-like 
imaginings already play a role in fiction and pretend play. 
 
In the case of pretend play, our difficulty stems from the fact that it is hard to 
specify what sorts of desires motivate children to engage in games of pretence. 
Desires specified in terms of the game (e.g. the child desires to bark at passers-
by) cast the child as having a limited grasp on the distinction between the real 
and the imaginary, and desires specified in terms of the actions the child is 
performing  appear  to  leave  out  why  the  child  is  engaging  in  their  game  of 
pretend (e.g. the child desires to point his finger at his sister and say ‘bang’). 
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As such, philosophers such as Velleman (2000) and Doggett and Egan (2007) 
have suggested that an imaginative counterpart to desire is the motivational 
state that underpins pretend play. Against this, I will argue that the introduction 
of desire-like imaginings does not manage to resolve the crucial question of how 
children are able to relate their real world actions to their imaginary world, and 
that we are better served by supposing that children can have desires to make 
such-and-such fictional. 
 
To begin this chapter, we will firstly consider how desire-like imaginings might 
relate to our mindreading abilities. 
 
2.2 Mindreading and Desire 
 
We can begin by noting that humans are capable of ‘mindreading’. What this 
means is that we can predict and explain other persons’ actions, and ascribe 
mental states to them. For example, if I know that James’s favourite ice cream 
flavour is chocolate, and I see James head towards an ice cream kiosk, I am 
capable  of  predicting  that  James  will  choose  chocolate  ice  cream  if  it  is 
available. Likewise, I am able to ascribe various beliefs and desires to James in 
this scenario (e.g. a belief that there is chocolate ice cream at the kiosk, a desire 
for chocolate ice cream etc.) and thus explain why James chose the chocolate 
ice cream. 
 
What underpins these abilities? Traditionally, there has been a debate between 
two views. Firstly, there is the theory-theory view, which suggests that humans 
possess a tacit theory of mind that contains information about how beliefs and 
desires combine to produce behaviour. For example, this tacit theory might 
elaborate on truisms like ‘people will perform actions to get what they want 
ceteris paribus’, or ‘people believe what they see ceteris paribus’ (Carruthers 
and Botterill 1999, p. 77-78).  
 
Secondly, there is the simulation approach, which suggests that we are able to 
mindread because we have an ability to simulate the mental states of others by 
taking our decision-making systems ‘offline’ (Gordon 1986, Goldman 1989). 
On this picture, when I predict James’s actions I don’t deploy a theory of how 
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beliefs and desires (e.g. a pretend belief that chocolate ice cream is nearby and 
a pretend desire for chocolate ice cream). 
 
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to adjudicate on this debate. Instead, 
we  need  to  consider  why  simulation  theorists  like  Currie  and  Ravenscroft 
(2002,  Ch.3)  think  an  explanation  of  mindreading  in  terms  of  simulation 
necessitates the introduction of an imaginative counterpart to desire. 
 
A typical argument for introducing simulated desires might run something like 
this: 
 
P1:  We  predict  and  explain  other  persons’  actions  by  simulating  their 
mental states. 
 
P2: The mental states that cause people's actions are their beliefs and 
desires. 
 
P3 (from P1 and P2): We are able to simulate others persons’ beliefs and 
desires. 
 
P4: A simulated mental state is an imaginative counterpart to said mental 
state. 
 
C: Simulated beliefs and desires are imaginative counterparts to beliefs 
and desires.  
 
For now, we can avoid attacking P1 directly, since we do not have space to 
assess  the  relative  benefits  of  simulation  vs.  theory-theory.  P2  reflects  the 
Humean view that all actions can be explained in terms of belief-desire pairs. 
This is common ground between participants in the mindreading debate, so I 
will accept this premise. For present purposes we should thus assess P3 and 
P4.  
 
We can begin by noting in relation to P3 that we can explain mindreading 
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Carruthers (2003) notes, it is undoubtedly correct that we must pay attention 
to peoples’ desires in order to predict their behaviour, but dealing with this 
issue does not necessarily require introducing an imaginative counterpart to 
desire.  
 
For example, we may be able to predict others’ actions by forming belief-like 
imaginings with contents that mimic the target’s beliefs and desires (in the 
case  of  James  and  his  ice  cream,  an  imagining  that  I  believe  chocolate  ice 
cream is nearby and an imagining that I desire chocolate ice cream), or by 
forming beliefs about the target’s beliefs and desires.  
 
On the first approach, we may still predict James’s actions by simulating his 
belief that there is ice cream nearby, but we don’t need to similarly simulate his 
desires: we just need to form a belief-like imagining with content related to 
wanting chocolate ice cream. On the second approach we embrace something 
like a theory-theory approach and thus end up rejecting P1. 
 
We can defend a move to these sorts of positions with an argument offered by 
Goldie  (2004,  pp.  334-335).  Goldie  notes  that  if  simulation  theory  is  the 
correct account of our mindreading abilities, then we have to ask how we know 
which desires to simulate in order to predict and explain the actions of others. 
Often an individual will have numerous competing desires, and we will need a 
way of determining which are strongest in order to predict the action they will 
actually perform. But how one would do this solely by simulating is unclear, 
and so it looks like an element of theory about desires will need to enter into 
the picture to enable us to mindread successfully. 
 
However, one might hold that these alternate explanations are not as plausible 
as one involving simulated desires. As such, we should now question P4 by 
considering whether ‘simulated’ desires are best thought of as an imaginative 
counterpart to desire and whether the notion of a simulated desire is plausible. 
One way to do this is by returning to the question from section 1.8 of how 
desire-like imaginings are supposed to behave.  
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they  do  not  reflect  our  actual  preferences  about  the  world,  and  they  don’t 
motivate us to perform any actions. When I ‘simulate’ James’s mental states, I 
won’t necessarily end up wanting chocolate ice cream for myself, nor will I 
necessarily be motivated to buy some  
 
Furthermore, it looks like we can entertain simulated desires at will: we are 
able to predict and explain the actions of persons with all kinds of desires we 
might never have, and to explain this proficiency we will have to allow that we 
can take on simulated desires that depart radically from our own desires. It is 
clear then, that genuine desires cannot make sense of mindreading. Even with 
no specific account of desire in mind it looks like it will be impossible to argue 
that simulated desires are just a species of desire. 
 
However, even if genuine desires cannot explain mindreading, we still have 
reason  to  be  sceptical  of  the  idea  that  ‘simulated  desires’  are  desire-like  in 
character and thus best thought of as an imaginative counterpart to desire. 
This is because, as we noted in section 1.8, there are some cases where it is 
hard to make sense of what it would be like to imagine desiring something we 
don’t find desirable in reality.  
 
For example, if I wish to predict the actions of someone who loves chocolate ice 
cream, but I happen to find chocolate ice cream revolting, it is unclear what it 
would  be  like  for  me  to  form  a  simulated  desire  for  chocolate  ice  cream, 
assuming this simulated desire must be desire-like in character. Similarly one 
could question how to simulate the desires of someone who is jealous of his 
wife’s lover. We can imagine having desires that lead to jealousy and longing, 
but it is unclear how to simulate specific desires about the man's wife if we 
don’t also have desires related to her. 
 
Bearing these phenomenological worries in mind, debates about how desire 
relates to our mindreading abilities are unlikely to settle whether desire has an 
imaginative  counterpart,  unless  one  can  give  a  clear  account  of  how  these 
simulated  desires  function  and  why  they  are  best  thought  of  as  being  an 
imaginative counterpart to desire.  
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That being said, one might think that if we can find reasons for introducing 
desire-like imaginings to explain pretend play or our engagement with fiction, 
then  we  can  move  to  propose  that  desire-like  imaginings  play  a  role  in 
mindreading, since they will be an accepted part of our cognitive architecture 
and deploying them in mindreading will give them a wider explanatory role. 
However, there are two related difficulties with making this sort of move. 
 
The first can be seen by reminding ourselves that one reason for holding that 
the ‘desires’ involved in mindreading are simulated desires is that they do not 
motivate us to perform actions (otherwise, in the case of James and his ice 
cream, I would end up actually buying chocolate ice cream from the kiosk). But 
it looks like this sort of desire-like state cannot also play a role in pretence 
behaviour, since the counterpart involved in pretend play will have to motivate 
the  real-world  actions  that  children  perform  when  engaging  in  games  of 
pretence. 
 
Likewise, the second difficulty is that the notion of an imaginative counterpart 
to  desire  involved  in  mindreading  can’t  be  identical  to  the  one  that  is 
introduced to explain our engagement with fictions. This is because the desire-
like states involved in the fiction case are supposed to be automatic responses 
to narratives, not subject to the will. 
 
For example, as Nichols (2004b, pp. 333-334) brings out, if when watching 
Macbeth 10 one  could  decide  to  entertain  desire-like  imaginings  that  had 
content related to Macbeth succeeding in his murderous quest for power, then 
it would be possible to have a very different experience of the play as compared 
to  when  we  form  desire-like  imaginings  related  to  Macbeth  failing  in  his 
endeavours.  However,  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that  we  can  vary  our  desire-like 
imaginings  in  order  to  have  these  different  experiences.  If  the  desire-like 
attitude we direct towards Macbeth and his goals is best thought of as being an 
imaginative counterpart to desire, then this counterpart is not subject to the 
will. 
                                                 
10 Nichols uses Othello in his example, but the rough structure of his example is the 
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In  the  case  of  mindreading,  however,  we  do  not  seem  to  face  this  sort  of 
restriction. We are able to predict and explain how murderous usurpers will 
act, and this seems to imply that we can simulate desires to murder one’s king 
etc., at will. As such, the notion of an imaginary desire at play in mindreading 
seems to be different to the one involved in our engagement with fiction. 
 
Now, as we noted in relation to imagined seeing and my first claim in chapter 
1,  it  is  possible  to  propose  that  a  mental  state  has  two  different  sorts  of 
imaginative  counterpart  –  one  subject  to  the  will,  and  the  other  a  more 
spontaneous response where real world feelings and actions constitute fictional 
feelings  and  actions.  But  these  two  types  of  imaginative  counterpart  are 
importantly distinct, and one can accept that one exists whilst denying that the 
other exists.   
 
Furthermore, even if one accepts something like the cluster theory of desire we 
introduced in section 1.8, and thus allows for desire-like imaginings to behave 
in different ways in the various activities they are supposed to play a role in, we 
will  still  require  a  separate  justification  for  their  introduction  in  every  case 
where their introduction is proposed. If we do not give separate arguments to 
justify the introduction of desire-like imaginings, we risk misclassifying desires 
that lack certain features as desire-like imaginings. In other words, we cannot 
solely rely on an argument based on the potentially wide explanatory role of 
desire-like imaginings to defend the introduction of simulated desires when 
explaining our mindreading abilities. 
 
The upshot of this is that we will require a positive argument as to why we 
should  introduce  an  imaginative  counterpart  to  desire  to  explain  our 
mindreading abilities, and this will involve defending a version of simulation 
theory that utilises simulated desires against both theory-theory approaches 
and versions of simulation theory that don’t utilise simulated desires. We do 
not have the space to further assess the prospects of a simulation theory that 
relies on simulated desires, but we can note that there is still no consensus 
about  whether  simulation  or  theory  forms  the  core  of  our  mindreading 
abilities,  nor  about  what  role,  if  any,  simulated  desires  should  play  in  our 
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Having seen why considering what underpins our mindreading abilities won’t 
definitively establish the case for introducing an imaginative counterpart to 
desire, we should now turn to consider whether a stronger case can be made by 
reflecting on the sorts of mental states that motivate children’s pretend play. 
 
2.3 Pretend Play 
 
It  has  been  widely  noted  that  children  often  engage  in  what  we  can  call 
‘pretence behaviour’. They will, for example, pretend that they are having tea 
parties with their toys and pour out imaginary cups of tea (Leslie 1994, p. 223). 
 
For  present  purposes,  we  need  concern  ourselves  only  with  a  motivational 
question about pretend play. What motivates children to engage in pretence 
behaviour? By this, I do not mean to ask why children choose to engage in 
pretend play (a question that appears to demand some of sort of evolutionary 
answer),  but  instead  to  ask  what  combination  of  mental  states  motivates 
pretence behaviour. 
 
As noted in section 1.8, the Humean view holds that all human actions can be 
explained in terms of, and are caused by, belief-desire pairs. If, for example, 
someone can be seen leaving their house with an umbrella, the Humean view 
will have it that they performed this action because they believe it is likely to 
rain and that they desire to not get wet (of course, other beliefs and desires 
may be at play here: one may believe it might rain etc.) 
 
However, pretend play is a problem case for this sort of approach, as it is hard 
to specify what beliefs and desires underpin pretence behaviour. As such, it has 
been  suggested  that  propositional  imaginings  have  to  play  a  role  in 
explanations of pretence behaviour, either instead of, or in addition to, beliefs 
(Nichols  and  Stich  2000,  2003  Ch.1).  On  these  sorts  of  views,  children’s 
pretend  play  is  motivated  either  by  beliefs  and  propositional  imaginings 
combining  with  desires,  or  by  propositional  imaginings  combining  with 
desires. 
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Egan  (2007)  (henceforth  D&E),  have  argued  that  we  need  to  introduce  an 
imaginative  counterpart  to  desire  to  explain  what  motivates  pretence 
behaviour. Thus on their views, we have propositional imaginings combining 
with ‘wishes’ (Velleman) or ‘i-desires’ (D&E). 
 
To see why some philosophers hold that desire-like imaginings are needed to 
explain pretend play, I will firstly set out in more detail why it is hard to specify 
the desires and beliefs that underpin pretence behaviour, and why this leads us 
to a puzzle about the kinds of mental states that motivate pretend play. 
 
2.4 Mad and Bad, or Sad? 
 
A young girl called Sarah is playing cops and robbers with her brother Harry. 
She is pretending to be the cop, and her brother is pretending to be the robber. 
During the game, Sarah runs up to her brother, holds out her index fingers, 
and shouts out: ‘Bang you’re dead!’. What motivated this action? As we noted, 
according to the Humean view, all actions can be explained in terms of belief-
desire pairs. But what sort of belief-desire pair can explain Sarah’s actions? 
 
One option is specify the belief-desire pair in terms of the game, and another is 
to do so in terms of the actual world. These options are both problematic. The 
first of these options is what we can call the ‘mad’ or ‘bad’ option. This would 
be to say that Sarah desires to kill her brother and believes that she can satisfy 
this  desire  by  holding  out  her  index  fingers  and  exclaiming:  ‘Bang  you’re 
dead!’. 
 
This approach renders Sarah as both having a ‘bad’ desire, and also as mad 
because  of  how  she  seeks  to  bring  about  her  desire.  She  is  rendered  bad 
because this approach portrays her as having the desire to kill her brother, and 
it is doubtful that she has this desire. For example, if after having said ‘Bang 
you’re dead!’ her brother had a sudden heart attack and fell to the ground, this 
would presumably make Sarah very unhappy: it is unlikely that she genuinely 
desires her brother’s death in this sort of case. 
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play. For example, Sarah may on another occasion pick up one of her dolls, 
dunk it into an empty basin, and exclaim that ‘Josie needs washing’. In this 
case, Sarah may well genuinely desire to wash her doll. Perhaps her mother has 
banned her from cleaning the doll, and if her mother saw her actions and then 
picked up the doll and washed it, this would satisfy Sarah’s desire. 
 
But,  the  present  explanation  also  construes  Sarah  as  mad,  and  this  worry 
applies to both the robber case and the doll case. This is because in addition to 
a desire to kill her brother, or wash her doll, we also have to ascribe to Sarah 
beliefs about how these desires are to be satisfied. However, we seem to be 
construing  Sarah  as  mad  and  fundamentally  confused  about  the 
reality/pretence  distinction  if  we  propose  that  she  believes  she  can  kill  her 
brother by pointing her fingers and saying ‘Bang you’re dead!’ or that she can 
wash her doll by dunking it into an empty basin.11 
 
To suggest that children are confused in this way is problematic, since there is 
a wide body of evidence that demonstrates children are relatively competent 
with the reality/pretence distinction. Indeed, work reported in Harris (2000, 
pp.  63-65)  demonstrates  that  even  children  with  imaginary  friends  are  still 
capable of keeping track of the differences between real things and things they 
merely imagine, and of noting the sorts of things that real friends can do that 
imaginary friends cannot. 
 
One  move  to  improve  the  mad  explanation  is  to  introduce  propositional 
imaginings.  For  example,  we  can  propose  that  Sarah  desires  to  shoot  her 
brother  and  imagines  that  she  can  achieve  this  result  by  shooting  him  (i.e. 
pointing  her  fingers  and  saying  ‘bang  you’re  dead!).  In  so  doing,  we  can 
propose that an imagining-desire pair is what motivates her action. 
                                                 
11 This  latter  case  is  still  somewhat  problematic:  if  Sarah  thinks  it  likely  that  her 
mother will wash her doll by virtue of having seen her pretend to wash the doll, then 
there is scope for thinking that Sarah can rationally believe that dunking her doll in an 
empty basin will lead to her doll being washed. However, this doesn’t change the fact 
that Sarah would be mad if she thought that dunking her doll in an empty basin would 
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However this explanation also leaves the motivation behind Sarah’s actions 
puzzling. We will still end up attributing the desire to shoot her brother to her, 
which is problematic in and of itself, regardless of the connections this desire 
has to her beliefs or imaginings. 
 
This sort of account may be helpful in cases such as doll washing, however, 
where we can allow that Sarah can gain some sort of satisfaction by acting out, 
in  a  pretend  way,  activities  that  are  similar  to  those  that  would  satisfy  her 
genuine  desires.  But  this  leaves  open  the  question  of  why  children  get 
satisfaction from acting out desired scenarios in a pretend way. 
 
The second sort of approach we might take is what I will call the ‘sad’ option. 
On this picture, we can try to explain Sarah’s motivation in terms of the actions 
she is performing. In other words, we can suppose that she raises her index 
fingers  and  says  ‘Bang  you’re  dead!’  because  she  desires  to  raise  her  index 
fingers and say ‘Bang you’re dead!’ and believes she can achieve this by raising 
her index fingers and saying ‘Bang you’re dead!’ 
 
The problem with this sort of explanation is twofold. The first problem is that it 
downplays the extent to which children can get lost in their games of pretence. 
It is intuitive to think that pretend play involves children acting spontaneously 
and imaginatively, and does not involve them merely desiring to raise their 
fingers etc. (Velleman 2000, pp. 256-257). 
 
We  can  also  back  up  this  worry  by  noting  that  adults  tend  to  be  worse  at 
engaging in pretend play as compared to children. This discrepancy is often 
chalked up to social inhibitions about engaging in games of pretence, but if the 
motivation  for  such  activities  merely  involves  having  desires  to  raise  one’s 
index  fingers  etc.,  then  it  is  unclear  why  adults  should  have  a  harder  time 
acting out such mundane desires as compared to children. The sad explanation 
doesn’t capture the way pretend play seems to be a very childlike phenomenon. 
 
The second problem is that the sad option does a bad job of explaining why 
children would bother performing pretend actions. Why would Sarah desire to 
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do with imagining that she is shooting her brother? 
 
One might attempt to sidestep this issue by supposing that Sarah’s desire to 
raise her fingers combines with an imagining that this is akin to shooting her 
brother, but this places an odd disconnect between the cognitive (belief-like 
imagining) and conative (desire) parts of her motivation. 
 
Ordinarily, someone will desire to do X (avoid the rain) and believe that doing 
Y (staying indoors) will bring about X (avoiding the rain), and so will perform 
action Y (stay indoors). In this case, however, we appear to be suggesting that 
Sarah desires to do X (raise her fingers), and imagines that she can achieve Y  
(killing  her  brother)  by  doing  X  (raising  her  fingers).  This  leaves  open  the 
questions of why she thinks can achieve Y by doing X and whether she desired 
to achieve Y (killing her brother). If we say that she did, then we will return to 
the mad explanation. 
 
Bearing this in mind, explaining Sarah’s actions in terms of a belief-desire pair 
will be problematic if we specify the pair in terms of the action she actually 
performs, or in terms of the ‘pretend’ action she is performing. And, we cannot 
solve this puzzle simply by supposing she is motivated by an imagining-desire 
pair. 
 
One might propose that we can avoid these issues by noting that they arise due 
us assuming that Sarah’s actions must be motivated by a desire. As we noted in 
section 1.8, the view that all desires are motivational is controversial, as is the 
view that all actions are motivated by desires. 
 
However, even if we deny that all desires are motivational, or that all actions 
are  motivated  by  desires,  we  are  still  left  with  the  crucial  question  of  what 
combination of mental states motivates children to engage in pretend play. It 
won’t do to simply say that one of them isn’t a desire, whilst leaving open the 
question  of  what  alternative  mental  states  might  be  doing  the  motivational 
work.  This  is  why  some  philosophers  have  introduced  an  imaginative 
counterpart to desire into the picture, but before we consider this view in detail 
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explanation. 
 
One  theory  that  utilises  real  desires  that  is  offered  to  solve  this  puzzle, 
endorsed  by  Stich  and  Nichols  (2000,  2003  Ch.1)  (henceforth  N&S),  is  the 
‘cognitive  theory  of  pretence’.  According  to  this  view,  the  motivation  for 
pretence  behaviour  cannot  be  understood  merely  by  looking  at  pretenders’ 
beliefs and desires, nor their imaginings and desires, but instead requires us to 
consider how all three mental states interact. 
 
2.5 Nichols and Stich’s Behavioural Approach 
 
On N&S’s cognitive account of pretence, motivation for pretend play consists in 
children imagining being, or doing, various things, and forming desires to act 
similarly to how the thing they are imagining would act, or to how they would 
act if they were doing what they imagine. For N&S, beliefs enter the picture 
because pretend play also involves children having beliefs about how the thing 
they are imagining would act if it were real. In other words, they propose that 
the following combination of states provides the motivation for pretend play: 
 
  1. Propositional imaginings (that I am a dog, that I am a cop, that I am 
having a tea party, etc.) 
  2.  Beliefs  about  how  things  behave  (that  dogs  bark,  that  cops  chase 
robbers, that tea parties involve serving tea, etc.) 
  3. Desires about what one wants to behave as-if (I want to behave like a 
dog, I want to behave like a cop, I want to behave as-if I were having a tea 
party) 
 
These combinations thus lead to actions such as barking like a dog, chasing a 
(hopefully) pretend robber and pouring out pretend tea. 
 
That  being  said,  it  is  not  supposed  to  be  the  case  that  children  have  a 
‘mentalistic’ understanding of these three mental states. Instead, N&S propose 
that children have a ‘behavioural’ understanding of pretence, and will simply 
pretend to bark like a dog because of this, without realising that they have 
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However, there are three difficulties facing this sort of approach. The first two 
are closely related: firstly the theory is too narrow, and secondly it is too broad, 
as an account of what motivates children to engage in pretend play. The final 
difficulty is that N&S’s account is subject to an objection Velleman (2000, p. 
257) calls the ‘depressing’ objection. 
 
Firstly then, there is the worry that the theory is too narrow. One way to bring 
out this issue is by considering N&S’s claim that in order for a child to pretend 
to be a dog, they must have beliefs about how dogs act in reality. D&E (2007, p. 
6) suggest that this sort of requirement is unnecessary, and give the example of 
a child pretending to be something non-existent, like a zombie. Presumably, 
this involves them following the conventions of how to pretend to act like a 
zombie, rather than consulting beliefs about how zombies behave. 
 
This criticism is not wholly convincing, however, since one could modify the 
N&S schema, and say that children require beliefs about how something would 
behave  in  reality  or  about  the  conventions  for  pretending  to  be  something. 
Furthermore, this belief constraint seems plausible in some cases. Kind (2011, 
p. 433) points out that it is unclear how a child could pretend to be a vervet if 
they have no idea what a vervet is or how a vervet behaves. 
 
However, we can also bring out the overly narrow nature of the N&S approach 
with another example. Consider a child pushing along a toy car whilst saying 
‘vroom vroom’. It seems that the child is not making this noise because he 
desires to act similarly to how a car would act (since he is pretending that the 
toy  car  is  a  real  car,  not  that  he  is  a  real  car).  Cases  like  this  involve  the 
generation of pretence behaviour that is not straightforwardly attributable to a 
prop or to the child, and thus it is hard to account for these activities on N&S’s 
picture (Friedman & Leslie 2007, pp. 115-116). As such, N&S’s account seems 
too narrow.  
 
The second difficulty with the account is that in some cases it is also too broad, 
particularly  when  we  bear  in  mind  the  question  of  how  children  recognise 
pretence behaviour in others. According to the N&S schema, children recognise 
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how something would behave in real life.  
 
The  problem  with  this,  however,  is  that  this  should  lead  to  children  often 
mistaking pretence actions for genuine actions and vice versa (Friedman and 
Leslie 2007, pp. 110-111). For example, if a child’s mother writes on a board 
with charcoal, the child ought to sometimes mistake her for pretending that the 
charcoal is a crayon or chalk. As Leslie and Friedman note, however, children 
are often very good at keeping track of what is a pretend action and what is a 
genuine action, and it is hard to explain this general record of success on N&S’s 
account of pretend play. 
 
One  might  suggest  that  we  can  address  this  issue  by  tightening  up  N&S’s 
notion of similarity/behaving as-if. But, the difficulty with attempting to do 
this is that the cognitive theory of pretence needs a loose notion of similarity to 
account  for  the  many  different  forms  of  pretence  behaviour  children  might 
engage in. 
 
For example, Sarah probably knows that real policemen don’t hold out their 
fingers  and  say  ‘Bang  you’re  dead!’,  and  the  notion  of  behaving  as-if  that 
explains this action will have to capture this fact. Thus, the defender of the 
N&S schema faces something of a dilemma. They must either tighten up the 
notion  of  behaving  as-if  to  explain  how  children  keep  track  of  the 
reality/pretence distinction, or loosen it to capture the various ways in which a 
pretend action can be similar to a genuine action. Either way, there will be 
problem cases to deal with. 
 
In addition to these worries about whether the cognitive account is too narrow 
and too broad, there is also a further objection to the theory, which is called the 
‘depressing objection’. There are two ideas behind this objection. Firstly, this 
sort of account of pretend play seems to over-intellectualise what is going on in 
children’s heads when they engage in pretend play, and secondly this account 
makes children’s activities out to be ‘depressingly un-childlike’ by placing them 
firmly outside their games of pretence (Velleman 2000, p. 257). According to 
this objection, the account N&S offer portrays children as behaving like actors 
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behave, or how they would act if the situation they are imagining were real, 
rather than getting ‘lost’ in their games of pretence. 
 
However, as we have already seen, citing desires phrased in terms of what the 
child  is  doing,  or  in  terms  of  what  they  imagine  to  be  the  case,  is  also 
problematic. Thus we are left with a puzzle as to how we should respond to this 
objection, since it is not clear how to make sense of what is going on here by 
making reference to the child’s desires. As such, one possible response is to 
suggest that pretend play is motivated by belief-like imaginings and desire-like 
imaginings, with these two states jointly behaving in a similar way to genuine 
belief-desire pairs.  
 
On  these  accounts,  it  is  proposed  that  Sarah  i-desires  (or  ‘wishes’,  to  use 
Velleman’s terminology) to shoot her brother and imagines that pointing her 
gun (fingers) at him and firing it (saying ‘bang’) can achieve this. Thus, we can 
suggest,  in  line  with  the  third  claim  of  chapter  1,  that  we  can  justify  the 
introduction  of  a  counterpart  to  desire  here  by  noting  a  puzzle  about  how 
desires could explain pretence behaviour, even though it is not clear that any 
constraints on desire have been violated. 
 
However,  in  order  to  justify  the  introduction  of  i-desires,  we  must  first 
consider  whether  we  can  defend  N&S’s  account  against  the  depressing 
objection, and we must also consider whether the move to i-desires/wishes 
gives us an adequate response to the depressing objection and makes sense of 
the puzzles about pretence we have noted.  
 
In the next section, I will argue that we might be able to defend N&S against 
the  depressing  objection,  and  that  the  introduction  of  i-desires  doesn’t 
necessarily deal with the objection. I will also suggest that the introduction of i-
desires/wishes  serves  to  deepen  the  mystery  of  what  motivates  children  to 
engage in games of pretend play by leaving out an explanation of how they link 
their real world actions with what they imagine to be the case. 
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2.6 I-Desires and the Depressing Objection 
 
There  are  at  least  two  moves  that  one  can  make  to  defend  N&S’s  account 
against  the  depressing  objection.  The  first  is  to  simply  bite  the  bullet  and 
accept that the explanation is depressing, and the second is to allow a role for 
non-conscious desires. 
 
In  relation  to  the  first  defence,  one  could  argue  that  an  explanation  being 
‘depressing’ doesn’t have to be taken as a good reason to think the explanation 
is false. However, this sort of move is fairly easy to counter – as we noted, one 
reason  why  N&S’s  account  is  said  to  be  depressing  is  because  it  over-
intellectualises what is going on in the child’s mind, since the account appears 
to attribute complex thoughts to children like ‘I want to act like a dog and to 
act like a dog I need to do X’.  
 
That being said, this response is in turn not wholly convincing since N&S offer 
a behavioural, rather than a mentalistic, account of pretence, so they can evade 
this  strand  of  the  depressing  objection  by  denying  that  their  theory  entails 
children have an understanding of these complex mental states. 
 
A second response is to argue that N&S’s use of desires will only strike us as 
depressing if we suppose that we are talking about children’s conscious desires. 
If  we  propose  that  a  child’s  desire  to  act  like  a  dog  is  in  some  sense  not 
conscious, this will give us another way of blunting the force of the depressing 
objection. 
 
Indeed, Kind (2011, p. 435) presses this point by noting that many seemingly 
spontaneous actions, such as the amorous embrace of a lover, will strike us as 
depressing if we explain the actions in terms of beliefs and desires that the 
persons performing the actions consciously entertain. Currie and Ravenscroft 
(2002, p. 124) likewise note that people are often drawn to do wonderful and 
creative things (such as writing poetry) based on desires and beliefs that they 
are only minimally aware of. 
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it  is  true  that  we  are  able  to  make  sense  of  the  depressing  objection  if  the 
mental states involved in pretend play are not conscious states, but why think 
that the desires involved in pretend play are not conscious? There is no obvious 
evidence that the desires involved are not conscious, other than the fact that if 
they  were  conscious  our  explanation  of  what  motivates  pretence  will  be 
depressing. 
 
However, if the defender of an i-desire/wish-based account were to make this 
sort of complaint, they would face a dilemma. Either they would have to admit 
that many other actions are depressing when explained in terms of beliefs and 
desires,  or  they  would  have  to  deny  that  said  actions  are  depressing.  Both 
horns are problematic. 
 
If one takes the first horn, then the depressing objection is no longer a special 
problem for children’s pretend play, and so using the objection to ground the 
introduction of i-desires/wishes will be too quick. On the second horn, it is 
unclear how to make things like the embrace of a lover seem less depressing 
without  relying  on  something  like  desires  that  aren’t  conscious.  This  then 
raises the question of why this solution can’t also work in the case of pretend 
play,  and  so  our  motivation  for  introducing  i-desires/wishes  is  undermined 
once again. 
 
At  this  point,  we  should  therefore  consider  whether  i-desire/wish-based 
accounts of pretend play are any less depressing than a genuine desire based 
account like N&S’s. D&E and Velleman both seem to hold that an explanation 
in terms of i-desire/wishes is less depressing, but neither of them is clear about 
precisely why this is so. Why is i-desiring or wishing to be a dog less depressing 
than desiring to act like a dog? 
 
For one thing, the i-desire account doesn’t explain how we avoid the picture of 
the child thinking about his pretence from outside of his game, as opposed to 
simply  ‘getting  lost’  in  his  imaginary  world.  Indeed,  as  Funkhouser  and 
Spaulding  (2009,  pp.  12-13)  note,  i-desire/wish-based  accounts  appear  to 
presuppose that belief-desire accounts of motivation will leave children outside 
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this  is  so,  particularly  if,  as  we  suggested  earlier,  we  can  allow  for  desires 
children are not consciously aware of to be involved. 
 
We can also bring out why the i-desire/wishing account is still subject to the 
depressing objection by noting that knowing how to bring about one’s i-desires 
or  wishes  presumably  involves  having  beliefs  about  what  sort  of  genuine 
actions (e.g. raising one’s index fingers) will count as ‘pretend’ actions (e.g. 
raising a gun). This worry is developed by O’Brien (2005, p. 60), who argues 
that the imaginings involved in pretend play can only play a motivational role 
when  they  are  ‘draped’  over  the  actual  world.  Bearing  this  in  mind,  she 
suggests  that  our  imaginings  can  only  serve  to  motivate  behaviour  in 
conjunction with beliefs. 
 
For example, if a child starts waving his arms up and down like an elephant’s 
trunk, this action will be motivated by both the child imagining that he is an 
elephant  and  by  the  child’s  belief  that  raising  his  arms  in  this  way  will 
constitute  moving  his  imaginary  trunk.  Without  these  beliefs,  the  child’s 
imaginings would have no direction. 
 
The same is true of the child’s supposed i-desires: the child will need some way 
of matching up his i-desire to raise his trunk with a desire to perform a real 
world action that will make it fictionally true that he is raising his trunk. In 
other  words,  the  depressing  objection  still  looms  over  i-desire/wish-based 
accounts of pretend play, since these approaches do not avoid the need for 
beliefs  and  desires  located  outside  of  the  pretence  to  play  a  role  in  the 
generation of pretence behaviour. 
 
We can press this issue by considering how D&E and Velleman conceive of the 
imaginative  counterpart  to  desire  involved  in  pretend  play.  The  core  of 
Velleman’s definition is that what he calls ‘wishes’ relate to unobtainable things 
that one wants in a ‘faint’ way (Velleman 2000, p. 260). In other words, he 
draws a distinction between desires and wishes on the basis of whether one can 
obtain what one wants. 
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Velleman’s distinction must rest on whether or not the agent knows his want is 
unobtainable. But, it is not clear that children always know the aims of their 
games of pretence are unobtainable, particularly if they are very young. What is 
to  say  that  a  two-year-old  who  is  jumping  up  and  down  flapping  his  arms 
doesn’t believe that he could somehow fly? Furthermore, in cases like Sarah’s 
doll  washing,  it  seems  odd  to  say  that  the  actual  washing  of  her  doll  is 
unobtainable. 
 
Secondly, in some cases this is an odd way of setting out how the child’s ‘want’ 
behaves.  Consider  Sarah  pointing  at  her  brother  and  saying  ‘Bang  you’re 
dead!’. It seems strange to suggest she wants to shoot her brother, but that this 
aim  is  merely  unobtainable  or  somewhat  ephemeral.  As  such,  Velleman’s 
account of wishes brings us back to the difficulties we faced when attempting 
to specify Sarah’s genuine desires. 
 
That being said, D&E are also critical of Velleman’s specification of wishes. In 
turn, they offer a minimal specification of how the imaginative counterpart to 
desire – which they call i-desire – behaves. They suggest that an i-desire is a 
desire-like  state  that  is  to  be  distinguished  from  desire  in  terms  of  its 
functional role, and that what this role is is a question for neuroscience (D&E 
2007, p. 10). 
 
Nonetheless, D&E’s minimal definition still proves problematic since they want 
i-desires to explain children’s pretend play and the apparent desires we direct 
towards fictional characters. This immediately raises a problem for them. In 
the case of pretend play, they need i-desires to be functionally analogous to 
desires in the sense that they play a motivating role of some sort. In the case of 
fiction, the opposite seems to be true: my ‘i-desire’ that Desdemona avoid her 
tragic fate does not motivate me to leap on the stage to save her. As we noted in 
1.8, one could hold that i-desires behave differently in different contexts, but 
this doesn’t change the fact that we need an account of how they are supposed 
to behave in the pretend play case, and of why various states that behave in 
different ways are all i-desires. 
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case of pretend play D&E appear to be relying on a conception of desire that 
sees desire as involving dispositions to action. Thus, one way of understanding 
their  introduction  of  i-desires  is  that  due  to  the  odd  nature  of  children’s 
pretend actions, we should think of pretend actions as being ‘quasi-motivated’. 
 
However, it is unclear why we should think of these sorts of actions as merely 
being quasi-motivated. D&E would presumably draw attention to the fact that, 
on their account, desires aim to make something true of the world, whereas i-
desires aim to make something ‘fictionally true’. But this raises the question of 
why children can’t have desires to make something fictionally true.  
 
Perhaps this attributes too much conceptual sophistication to children, but it is 
unclear why desiring to make something fictional is more sophisticated than i-
desiring to make something fictional.  For example, as we noted earlier, in 
order to know what would make it the case that one’s i-desire is satisfied, one 
needs beliefs about how one’s pretend actions relate to reality, and a desire to 
make the real world fit one’s pretend aims. 
 
We can also bring out the difficulty here by reminding ourselves of Walton’s 
account of fictional truth. In cases like the one where Sarah holds out her index 
fingers and says ‘Bang you’re dead!’, it seems that D&E want to say something 
like *Sarah desires to shoot her brother*, whilst also denying that we need to 
allow that Sarah desires *to shoot her brother*. 
 
But  why  can’t  we  allow  for  it  to  be  true  that  Sarah  desires  to  *shoot  her 
brother*, with this entailing that *Sarah desires to shoot her brother* without 
necessitating the introduction of a counterpart to desire? In so doing, we could 
draw  a  parallel  with  how  we  can  avoid  introducing  a  counterpart  to 
amusement, whilst still allowing that it can be true that *I am amused*. As we 
noted  in  my  second  claim  of  chapter  1,  a  real  world  action  or  feeling 
constituting  a  fictional  action  or  feeling  is  not  enough  to  justify  the 
introduction of an imaginative counterpart. 
 
Before we consider how this account can be developed, I will firstly offer two 
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involving  genuine  desires,  to  show  that  the  introduction  of  i-desires  may 
deepen the puzzles related to pretend play. 
 
2.7 Some Points in Favour of Desire 
 
A first consideration that has been offered in favour of a desire-based account 
is  that  children  only  tend  to  engage  in  games  of  pretence  where  they  are 
pretending  to  do  something  they  genuinely  want  to  do,  or  where  they  are 
emulating something that they admire in some sense (Carruthers 2003, 2006). 
That is to say, usually children pretend to be brave cops or animals they find 
interesting, etc. One doesn’t often hear stories about children pretending to be 
slugs. 
 
However, this strikes me as potentially oversimplifying the variation in games 
of pretence. It is not clear that children do usually pretend to be things they 
admire or wish to be, and indeed one would need a great deal of empirical 
evidence to prove this claim. N&S (2003, p. 20) note the case of a child who 
pretends to be dead cat – something the child presumably does not admire or 
aspire to be.12 
 
We should note that the initial context for Carruthers’s (2003) point is that he 
is arguing against the claim that we can form i-desires at will. He takes the fact 
that children tend to pretend to be things they admire as showing that their 
genuine desires ground their games of pretence. If i-desires were involved, he 
is assuming that they would be under the control of the will, and that we would 
therefore  have  more  cases  of  children  pretending  to  be  things  they  didn’t 
genuinely desire to emulate. 
 
                                                 
12 Carruthers  would  respond  that  children  only  usually  pretend  to  be  things  they 
admire. He suggests this child may have pretended to be a dead cat because he desired 
to do something funny (Carruthers 2006, p. 107). Even still, it strikes me that more 
needs to be done to ground precisely what this notion of admiration amounts to, and 
more evidence is needed to establish that children ‘usually’ pretend to be things they 
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But whilst the desire-like states involved in mindreading have to be subject to 
will (if they exist), there is no obvious reason why the same must be true of the 
desire-like states involved in generating pretence behaviour. D&E, for example, 
do not explicitly consider whether their notion of an i-desire has a role to play 
in mindreading, nor do they suggest that i-desires must be subject to the will.  
 
A  second  reason  to  favour  desire-based  accounts,  which  I  find  more 
persuasive,  can  be  found  in  Kind  (2011,  pp.  437-438).  She  notes  that  if  i-
desires are implicated in games of pretence, it is unclear what content they 
have. 
 
She gives the example of her son pretending to fly by flapping his arms. She 
suggests there are two options: either he i-desires to fly or he i-desires to flap 
his arms. Since i-desires are supposed to be free of normative constraints, we 
have good reason to think that if her son is going to i-desire anything, he will i-
desire to fly. Why i-desire to flap your arms when you can entertain the far 
more interesting i-desire to fly? 
 
However,  saying  her  son  i-desires  to  fly  doesn’t  help  to  explain  his  arm 
flapping. Presumably, if he really i-desired to fly, he would jump up and down 
and  try  to  propel  himself  into  the  air,  etc.  Now,  it  could  be  objected  that 
although Kind is right to hold that it is hard to pinpoint her son’s i-desire, it 
will be equally difficult to pinpoint the content of her son’s real desire. It seems 
odd  to  think  that  when  a  child  pretends  to  be  flying  like  a  bird  he  merely 
desires to flap his arms, and saying he desires to fly will make it difficult to 
explain his actions and render him ‘mad’. 
 
However,  we  can  offer  a  response  to  this  sort  of  worry  by  drawing  on 
Funkhouser  and  Spaulding  (2009,  p.  10).  They  note  that  explanations  of 
actions in terms of genuine desires have a history of success, and that therefore 
even though this sort of case is puzzling, there is still reason to think that the 
correct explanation of pretend play will make use of real desires. At the very 
least, this sort of consideration allows us to bring out that if i-desires can’t 
neatly explain pretend play, we have no good reason to introduce them. We 
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play that works, rather than spending time introducing novel mental states and 
then  seeking  to  resolve  the  new  puzzles  we  are  left  with  upon  their 
introduction. 
 
But all this suggests is that we need some sort of desire-based account, and as 
we  already  noted,  N&S’s  account  has  been  criticised  not  only  due  to  the 
depressing objection, but also on the grounds that their approach is too narrow 
and too broad, and thus has difficulties explaining the recognition of pretence. 
I think a better account can be given by supposing that children can desire to 
make things fictionally true, a proposal I will now sketch in more detail to 
conclude this chapter. 
 
2.8 Desiring to Make Something Fictional 
 
On this picture, when a child engages in pretence behaviour, such as barking 
like  a  dog,  what  motivates  him  is  (at  least  sometimes)  a  desire  to  make  it 
fictionally true that he is a dog (or more formally to desire that *P*).13 This 
improves on N&S’s approach in several respects, and can also overcome the 
depressing objection. 
 
For example, this approach makes sense of cases where a child pushes a car 
along and makes a ‘vroom’ noise. The child wants to make it fictionally the case 
that the car is real, or that it is a race car travelling at a fast speed, and they 
satisfy  this  desire  by  making  this  sound  and  pushing  the  car.  Thus,  their 
motivation can be explained without having to explain how their behaviour 
resembles the behaviour of actual cars. 
 
Nevertheless,  this  approach  will  still  face  difficulties  when  it  comes  to 
explaining how children recognise pretence. The issue of recognition, as Liao 
and Gendler (2011, p. 10) point out, has been largely ignored by philosophers 
                                                 
13 We should avoid the strong claim that all pretence behaviour is explicable in this 
way. We can allow that sometimes children will desire to act like their sibling or copy 
an adult, and we can allow for there to be pretence behaviour that isn’t driven by the 
imagination, as noted by Currie (2002, pp. 205-206). 69	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working  on  pretend  play,  and  this  issue  is  one  that  afflicts  all  theories  of 
pretend play that don’t follow Leslie’s (1987) lead in proposing that children 
possess  the  concept  PRETEND  and  have  a  ‘conceptual’  understanding  of 
pretence. 
 
That  being  said,  the  ‘desire  to  make  fictional’  approach  is  compatible  with 
Leslie’s  view,  since  we  can  allow  that  children  are  able  to  desire  to  make 
something fictionally true partly by virtue of knowing what it would be to make 
something fictionally true. This might involve children having possession of 
something like a PRETEND concept, and we could then rely on this conceptual 
understanding to explain their recognition of pretence. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  if  Leslie  is  incorrect  to  attribute  this  conceptual 
understanding to children, and a better account of recognition can be found by 
referring  to  behavioural  cues,  then  the  approach  can  accommodate  this. 
Desiring  to  make  something  fictionally  true  does  not  have  to  entail  a 
conceptual understanding of desiring to make something fictionally true. 14 
 
Thus, though this approach does not directly address the issue of recognition, 
it can piggyback on other accounts that attempt to deal with this issue Perhaps 
more  crucially,  however,  one  might  think  this  account  does  no  better  than 
N&S’s in evading the depressing objection. For example, one might hold that 
desiring to make something fictionally true will entail children acting partly 
outside  of  their  pretence,  since  they  will  need  to  reflect  on  how  to  make 
something fictionally true by performing real-world actions. 
 
We can respond to the depressing objection by accepting that someone can 
desire to make something fictionally true without being aware that this is what 
they  desire.  Furthermore,  it  strikes  me  that  desiring  to  make  something 
fictionally true is a no more depressing account of pretend play as compared to 
                                                 
14 A similar sort of point is also made by Schellenberg (forthcoming, pp. 18-19), who 
phrases the issue in terms of the distinction between mental states with conceptual, as 
compared  to  non-conceptual,  content.  Bearing  in  mind  this  distinction,  she  also 
endorses a view of pretence that focuses on desires to make something fictional. 70	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proposing that children i-desire to make X occur. This account still involves 
children  ‘wanting’  to  make  it  fictionally  true  that  X,  only  without  an 
explanation of how children know what will make X fictionally true. 
 
Another advantage of proposing that children can have desires to make things 
fictional, is that this helps to make sense of the dilemma noted by Kind about 
whether her son desires to fly, or flap his arms, etc. On this account, her son 
will desire to make it fictionally true that he can fly, but the actions that make 
this fictionally true will be mere arm flapping. 
 
As such, we can now evade this dilemma without also returning to the sad/mad 
issue that arises when we attempt to specify the desires that motivate pretence. 
Children are not mad to desire to make it fictionally true that they can fly, nor 
is this an obviously sad description of the motivational state that leads to them 
flapping their arms. 
 
One final advantage of this approach relates to the ‘bad’ aspect of some of the 
apparent desires that lie behind pretence behaviour: we now have two ways to 
specify the motivational state that lead Sarah to pretend to shoot her brother. 
Firstly, we can propose that she desired to make it fictional that her brother 
was dead. However, we might think this still gets her desire wrong, since it is 
unclear  that  she  desired  her  brother’s  death,  even  if  this  death  was  only 
fictional. 
 
By linking desires and fictionality, we have a second option available. In the 
game Sarah and her brother are playing, it may be fictional that there is a cop 
chasing a robber, but it does not have to be fictional that this cop is Sarah and 
that the robber is her brother (i.e. it may be false that *Sarah’s brother is a 
robber*). It only needs to be the case that Sarah’s brother is pretending to be a 
robber (that Sarah’s brother *is a robber*). On this latter score, Sarah does not 
have to be construed as desiring to make it fictionally true that she kills her 
brother: she may only desire to make it fictionally true that she kills the robber. 
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2.9 Chapter Summary 
 
In  this  chapter,  we  have  seen  that  puzzles  related  to  what  underpins  our 
mindreading abilities, and what mental states motivate pretend play, do not 
give  us  a  compelling  reason  for  introducing  an  imaginative  counterpart  to 
desire. 
 
In the case of mindreading, this is because it is problematic to hold we can 
enter into a counterpart to desire at will, and because we can make sense of 
mindreading  either  by  allowing  that  we  can  imagine  that  someone  desires 
something or by allowing that we can form beliefs about others’ desires. 
 
In  the  case  of  pretend  play,  we  faced  a  puzzle  when  trying  to  specify  how 
children’s desires behave in relation to pretence. However, it looks like the best 
way  of  dealing  with  this  problem  is  not  by  introducing  an  imaginative 
counterpart  to  desire,  since  introducing  desire-like  imaginings  in  this  case 
serves to introduce new mysteries and exacerbate existing ones. In particular, 
we  still  face  questions  about  how  i-desires  motivate  real-world  actions  and 
about what the contents of i-desires are supposed to be.  
 
We can offer a better account of pretend play by proposing that children can 
desire to make things fictionally true. I have not been able to set out a full 
defence of this account, but I hope to have demonstrated that it is an initially 
plausible way of explaining pretend play, which improves in several respects on 
N&S’s approach and approaches that utilise counterparts to desire. 
 
In the next chapter, we will consider a further problem case, which involves 
what Kind (2011, p. 32) calls passive as compared to active imaginings: the 
question of how we account for our desires that appear to be directed towards 
fictional characters. 
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Chapter 3: Desire and Fiction 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we will be concerned with whether the ‘desires’ we apparently 
direct towards fictional characters are in fact i-desires15. 
 
I will begin by setting out some arguments that purport to show why we cannot 
have genuine desires directed at fictional characters – the so-called ‘simple’ 
solution. These difficulties are said to get us to the view that desires apparently 
directed at fictional characters are actually directed at fictions – the ‘change of 
content’  solution.  I  will  argue  that  none  of  these  arguments  is  entirely 
convincing,  and  that  we  may  not  have  to  abandon  the  simple  solution  as 
readily as defenders of i-desires suppose. 
 
However,  I  will  then  set  aside  my  scepticism  about  these  arguments  and 
consider  two  problem  cases  that  are  said  to  demonstrate  why  a  change  of 
content  solution  is  unsatisfactory,  which  are  developed  by  Currie  and 
Ravenscroft  (2002:  Ch.1)  and  Doggett  and  Egan  (2007,  2011)  (henceforth 
D&E).  These  cases  are  thought  to  demonstrate  that  the  change  of  content 
approach entails that we must problematically attribute conflicting desires to 
persons engaging with some fictions: for example, a desire that a fiction both 
has and does not have a tragic conclusion.  
 
Having set out this worry, I will then explain why some philosophers argue that 
we have to introduce i-desires in order to make sense of what is going on here 
– the ‘change of attitude’ solution (D&E, 2007, 2011, Currie 2010). I will argue 
that  the  path  from  the  change  of  content  solution  to  the  introduction  of  i-
desires is unclear, and that there is no obvious reason to prefer this approach 
as compared to endorsing the simple solution. 
 
I will then consider a problem case developed by Currie (2010), which focuses 
                                                 
15 Writers  on  this  issue  all  tend  to  talk  in  terms  of  i-desires,  so  I  will  use  this 
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on desires directed towards real individuals rather than fictional characters. 
This case is said to demonstrate a difficulty with the simple solution, which 
doesn’t depend on whether we have to move from the simple solution to a 
change of content solution. On the basis of this case, Currie (2010, p. 635) also 
gives a test for judging whether a desire is really an i-desire: 
 
‘A  putative  desire,  A,  is  an  i-desire  and  not  really  a  desire  if  A  has 
satisfaction conditions, a canonical statement of which makes reference 
to a fiction which is not also the object of A.’ 
 
I will argue that Currie’s argument need not force us into introducing i-desires. 
Firstly, I will argue that Currie’s proposed test for whether a desire is really an 
i-desire has odd consequences for what it takes to have an i-desire, in that it 
appears to make the desire/i-desire distinction depend on external factors.  
 
Secondly,  I  will  argue  that  his  reasons  for  introducing  i-desires  would  also 
warrant us introducing i-i-desires etc. when we have fictions embedded within 
other fictions. To defend his view against this worry, it looks like we need to 
endorse something like a change of content solution about i-desires or allow 
that i-desires are differentiated by the fictions they concern. Whichever of the 
two responses we make, we will be left with a question about why we cannot 
apply this response to explain Currie’s case in terms of genuine desires. 
 
To conclude this chapter I will suggest that the best way to build an account of 
our conative attitudes towards fictional characters is to focus on what makes it 
fictional that we desire something. I will propose that we can capture what 
makes it fictional that we desire something without introducing i-desires and I 
will  bring  out  some  general  reasons  for  thinking  that  an  account  of  our 
engagement with fiction that relies on genuine desires should be preferred to 
one that relies on i-desires, even if the exact form of this genuine desire theory 
is not clear. 
 
To  begin,  we  should  first  lay  out  what  our  options  are  when  it  comes  to 
explaining the desires that we appear to direct towards fictional characters. 
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3.2 Three Options 
 
When  discussing  our  engagements  with  works  of  fiction,  we  often  use 
sentences that suggest we have desires directed towards fictional characters. 
For example, when discussing Romeo and Juliet with a friend, one might say 
something like: 
 
  ‘I wanted Romeo to realise Juliet was only sleeping.’ 
 
This  example  represents  our  tendency  to  talk  about  wanting  fictional 
characters to perform various actions, or come to certain realisations, etc. In 
addition, we also sometimes appear to talk about desires related to our own 
preferences. For example, one might profess: 
 
  ‘I wanted to tell Romeo that Juliet was only sleeping.’ 
 
There are three options for accounting for these apparent desires. The first is 
what we can call the ‘simple’ solution. According to the simple solution, one 
just can have genuine desires directed at fictional characters. On this picture, a 
sentence  such  as  ‘I  wanted  Romeo  to  realise  Juliet  was  only  sleeping’  will 
straightforwardly express one of your desires. 
 
However, there are worries with this approach related to whether we can direct 
our  desires  towards  fictional  characters  we  know  do  not  exist  and  whose 
behaviour we cannot interfere with. As such, we might move to the second 
option and suggest that we need to adopt a ‘change of content’ solution to deal 
with our desires directed at fictional characters (Nichols 2004b, p. 332). 
 
On this view, we should think of a desire that Romeo should live as actually 
being  a  desire  that  Romeo  should  live  in  the  fiction.  This  is  similar  to  my 
suggestion in chapter 2 that children can desire to make things fictionally true, 
only in this case one simply desires for X to be fictionally true, rather than 
desiring to make X true. On this approach our desires are, strictly speaking, 
not directed at fictional characters: they are directed at fictions. 
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The  final  option  is  what  we  can  call,  following  Currie  (2010,  p.  633),  the 
‘change of attitude’ solution. According to this response, the simple solution 
has the content right, but the attitude (desire) wrong. Supporters of this view 
suggest that when engaging with Romeo and Juliet, we i-desire that Romeo 
should  live.  In  other  words,  they  claim  that  we  have  to  introduce  an 
imaginative counterpart to desire to make sense of what is going on when we 
suggest that we want fictional characters to do various things.  
 
Defenders of this approach tend to argue that constraints on desire rule out the 
simple solution, and that the change of content solution leaves us with a puzzle 
about  our  conative  attitudes  towards  fictions  that  can  only  be  solved  by 
introducing  i-desires.  Thus  they  claim  that  introducing  a  counterpart  is 
justified in both of the ways I noted in the third claim of chapter 1: desires 
about  fictional  characters  violate  constraints  on  genuine  desires,  and 
introducing  i-desires  helps  to  solve  puzzles  about  our  engagement  with 
fictions. 
 
The first issue to consider is why constraints on desire are supposed to render 
the simple solution problematic, and why the change of content solution is 
sometimes  proposed  as  a  better  account  of  what  is  going  on.  We  can  then 
consider what is wrong with the change of content approach, and why this 
might lead us to the change of attitude view. That being said, I will resist the 
charges against the simple solution, and we will return to defend the simple 
solution in section 3.5. 
 
3.3 The Simple Solution 
 
There are four main arguments we can offer to show why the simple solution 
might not work. The first three rest on considerations about the constraints 
that are supposed to be operative on our genuine desires. The first concerns 
the  relation  between  desire  and  non-existents,  the  second  desire  and 
possibility, and the third desire and motivation. The fourth argument is one 
which  purports  to  show  that  we  are  rationally  required  to  move  from  the 
simple solution to the change of content solution, since having desires about 
fictional characters will entail having desires about fictions.  
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In relation to the first worry, one might think it is problematic to suppose we 
can have desires directed at fictional characters like Romeo and Juliet because 
they are non-existent. As we noted in section 1.3, this is one of the reasons why 
we must introduce propositional imaginings. It is problematic to believe that 
someone who we know to be non-existent is performing certain actions, and so 
it  is  usually  suggested  that  when  we  engage  with  fictions,  we  imagine  in  a 
belief-like way that fictional characters are performing various actions.  
 
Perhaps the same can be said of desires directed at fictional characters. It is 
equally problematic, so the argument would go, to say that you want someone 
that you know does not exist to perform certain actions or avoid a certain fate. 
So, we have a first way of setting up a problem with the simple solution: noting 
a  difficulty  with  supposing  that  people  have  desires  directed  towards  non-
existent things. 
 
However, the difficulty with this first way of attacking the simple solution is 
that it is not at all clear that desires are ordinarily constrained by whether their 
objects are known to be existent. Kind (2011, p. 425) gives two possible counter 
examples: we can desire that our children meet their deceased grandparents, 
and we can desire that our future children lead happy and fulfilling lives.  
 
That being said, neither of these counter-examples is entirely analogous to the 
fiction  case  since  we  are  talking  about  persons  who  either  have  existed,  or 
might  exist  in  the  future,  not  ones  who  simply  do  not  exist.  But  as  Moran 
(1994, pp. 76-80) brings out in relation to the emotions and the non-actual, 
these sorts of cases do not have to be directly analogous to the fiction case. Our 
counter-examples  only  need  to  show  that  there  is  not  something  obviously 
wrong with saying that X has desires about something they believe to be non-
actual. 
 
A second way one might try to bring out what is wrong with the simple solution 
would be to suggest that the issue concerns not the status of the object of the 
desire, but the possibility of the desire’s satisfaction. We can suggest that we 
cannot have desires that we know to have impossible satisfaction conditions, 
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satisfaction conditions. 
 
For example, we can note that when someone says ‘I wanted Romeo to realise 
Juliet was only sleeping’, they know that it is impossible for this desire to be 
satisfied. The script for Romeo and Juliet was written long before they saw a 
performance of the play, and the observer is likely to be aware that Romeo will 
not realise what has happened in the tomb. That being said, this picture will 
become  more  complicated  when  we  consider  fictions  where  observers  are 
unaware of what will occur, so this argument may not force us to reject the 
simple  solution  in  every  case,  even  if  one  thinks  the  argument  works  with 
fictions like Romeo and Juliet. 
 
More importantly, it is unclear whether desiring the impossible is generally 
seen  as  problematic.  Currie  (1990,  p.  201)  gives  a  counter-example:  as  a 
formalist, he desires to refute Gödel’s theorem even though he knows this is 
impossible. Again, it is unclear whether such an example is directly analogous 
to the case of fiction, but it is not obviously wrongheaded to suppose that we 
can sometimes desire the impossible. 
 
A third way we might attempt to set up the problem with the simple solution is 
to focus on our lack of motivation to save tragic heroines etc. when engaging 
with fictions. Though I may say that I wanted to tell Romeo that Juliet was only 
sleeping, I do not ordinarily find myself shouting this at him from the stalls, 
nor do I find myself running onto the stage to rip the poison from his hands.  
 
Regardless of whether one thinks that all desires are essentially motivational, 
this lack of motivation might still seem puzzling since desires at the very least 
usually have some sort of connection to motivation. That being said, it is also 
hard to make a case for rejecting the simple solution on the basis of our lack of 
motivation to interfere with fictions since we can also make sense of this issue 
by drawing on a rich discussion in Walton (1990: Ch. 5).  
 
Walton points out that when watching a play where a heroine is about to be 
run over by a train, we could, if we so wished, jump onto the stage and lift her 
off  the  train  tracks,  but  we  then  face  the  further  question  of  whether  this 78	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constitutes saving her. For Walton it does not, and this is a consequence of his 
approach to fictional truth. As we noted in section 1.2, for Walton something is 
fictionally true if we are prescribed to imagine it. In the present case, we are 
not prescribed to imagine, as observers of the play, that we can interfere with 
the proceedings, and it is also not fictionally true that we are characters in the 
play.  
 
Thus, even if someone does leap onto the stage, this does not make it fictionally 
the case that they are a character in the play. And, a fortiori, if someone is not 
a character in the play, then this rules out the possibility of them interfering 
with the events of the play. If this is right, then the problem with motivation 
may not be due to our lacking genuine desires directed at fictional characters, 
but may instead be due to rules about our powers to interfere with fictions. 
 
Bearing in mind my scepticism about these three supposed difficulties, it looks 
like considerations about the constraints we should place on genuinely desiring 
something  are  not  enough  to  make  us  reject  the  simple  solution.  However, 
there is one final argument we can give as to why we should reject the simple 
solution that doesn’t rely on placing constraints on desire, which is found in 
D&E (2011, pp. 284-285). 
 
D&E begin their argument by suggesting that desiring that such-and-such will 
occur – where ‘such-and-such’ refers to some event in a fiction – will entail 
that you desire that such-and-such will occur in the fiction. This is because it is 
impossible for your desire to be satisfied unless the event occurs in fiction. 
 
Bearing  this  in  mind,  D&E  propose  that  we  are  in  some  sense  rationally 
required to move from desires like ‘I wanted Romeo to live’, to desires about 
fictions like ‘I wanted Romeo to live in the fiction’, since the latter desire makes 
reference to the only possible satisfaction condition for the former desire. In 
other words, they take us as being rationally required to embrace the change of 
content solution. 
 
However, it is not clear that we are rationally required to make this jump from 
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this argument is that it at best merely shows that observers of fictions ought to 
note  the  entailment  between  desires  about  fictional  characters  and  desires 
about  fiction,  not  that  they  do  note  this  entailment.  Weinberg  and  Meskin 
(2006, p. 234) draw a parallel with one who desires to become a professional 
philosopher  but  doesn’t  wish  to  become  penurious,  even  though  being  the 
former often entails the latter. 
 
As such, it looks like we have no clear reason to abandon the simple solution 
for the change of content solution. That being said, one might not be convinced 
by my responses to these four arguments. As such, we should now consider 
how the change of content solution should be understood and why difficulties 
with it have led philosophers to introduce i-desires to explain our engagement 
with fictions. 
 
3.4 A Change Of Content 
 
To recapitulate, the change of content solution has it that when a desire is 
apparently  directed  towards  a  fictional  character,  the  desire  should  be 
paraphrased in terms of the fiction the character is in. In other words, we have 
to go from desires like: 
 
  1) I want Romeo to live. 
 
To desires of the form: 
 
  2) I want Romeo to live in the fiction. 
 
Now, ignoring the questions we raised in the previous section about whether 
(2) is to be preferred to (1), we should consider why (2) is seen as problematic. 
The issue with saying people have desires like (2) can be brought out with two 
related  examples  discussed  by  D&E  (2007,  2011)  (which  are  based  on  an 
example found in Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, pp. 19-23). 
 
The first example is the case of someone watching The Sopranos. At one point 
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profess to having felt anxious whilst this event was taking place (D&E 2011, p. 
279). Ordinarily, they suggest, a belief-desire pair leads to us having a feeling 
of anxiety. 
 
Consider an example of my having an anxious response to something. During 
the 2012 US Open final between Andy Murray and Novak Djokovic, Murray 
raced into a two set to love lead, and I found myself overcome with a feeling of 
anxiety. Why? 
 
As we just noted, we can answer this question by drawing attention to a belief-
desire pair. My beliefs about Murray – that he often loses Grand Slam finals, 
that he often loses to Djokovic, that he often slips from a winning position to 
ultimately losing big matches, etc. – combined with my desire that Murray 
should win the match, produced in me a feeling of anxiety.16 
 
D&E suggest something similar must be true of the Sopranos case. They want 
Tony Soprano to escape from the police, and they realise that this outcome is 
uncertain  and  so  feel  anxious.  This  seems  to  entail  that  they  ‘wanted  Tony 
Soprano  to  escape  from  the  police’,  which  we  are  assuming  should  be 
paraphrased as wanting Tony Soprano to escape the police in the fiction. So we 
have: 
 
  3) I want Tony Soprano to escape from the police in the fiction. 
 
However,  they  suggest  that  this  is  simply  false  since  they  have  faith  in  the 
writers of The Sopranos to make the best choice about Tony’s fate, regardless 
of whether this will involve him escaping or being caught. In other words, they 
think that (3) is too strong, since it commits them to having a preference as to 
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what the outcome of this fictional scenario should be, when in fact they are 
ambivalent about the outcome (D&E 2011 pp. 280-281). 
 
Their second example is of Romeo and Juliet. In this case, as we already noted, 
it seems that people sometimes have desires like (2). D&E suggest that once 
again  this  seems  wrongheaded.  Knowing  that  Romeo  and  Juliet  is  a  tragic 
masterpiece, it certainly seems as if we don’t want Romeo to evade his tragic 
fate in the fiction: if this were to come to pass, we would think that the play 
would lose much of its aesthetic merit. Yet, we will still report that we wanted 
him to avoid his tragic fate. Thus it looks like the change of content solution 
construes us as desiring two mutually exclusive things: that Romeo both lives 
and dies in the fiction (D&E 2011, pp. 280-282). 
 
But  why  is  this  problematic?  A  first  suggestion  might  be  that  holding  two 
contradictory  desires  is  irrational  in  some  sense.  For  example,  we  could 
introduce some sort of rationality criterion about desires, which states that it is 
irrational to hold contradictory desires. 
 
However, the problem with this move is that it is unclear why we should accept 
that  our  desires  are  constrained  by  some  sort  of  rationality  criterion.  Kind 
(2011, p. 429) gives the example of a mother whose son is about to go off to 
university  and  leave  her  alone.  Because  she  doesn’t  want  to  be  alone,  she 
doesn’t want her son to go to university; but at the same time, she knows that 
going to university will be good for him, and so also desires that he should 
leave home. Thus, the mother appears to have contradictory desires. 
 
Now,  one  could  argue  that  this  just  shows  that  the  mother  has  irrational 
desires, which fall short of the rationality constraints that ought to govern her 
desires. But, at best, this move would only show that she should not have such 
desires, not that she does not. Moreover, if we can have contradictory desires 
related to the real world, it becomes unclear why contradictory desires related 
to fictions are a special problem. 
 
That being said, there is something problematic about desiring for the world to 
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desire not-P. There is an important difference between desiring ‘P and not-P’ 
and desiring ‘P’ and desiring ‘not-P’. Unless we can show consumers of fiction 
have a desire of the former sort, then an argument based on conflict won’t be 
wholly convincing. 
 
However, though the present worry with the change of content solution is easy 
to read as one of conflicting desires, D&E (2011, pp. 281-282) suggest that the 
central  issue  their  examples  bring  out  is  not  related  to  holding  conflicting 
desires. Walton (1978, p. 25) notes this point when he says in relation to this 
sort of puzzle: 
 
‘He [the observer of a play with a tragic ending] may be entirely aware 
of both ‘desires,’ and yet feel no particular conflict between them’ 
 
D&E point out that in the Romeo and Juliet case, it is plausible to hold that 
you simply desire for the play to have a tragic ending. If you desired that it had 
both a happy and tragic ending, they suggest that this should mean that you 
feel disappointed at the end of the play, since one of your desires will remain 
unsatisfied (D&E 2011, pp. 281-282). 
 
As Currie (2010, p. 636) puts the issue, the current sketch of the change of 
content view makes us out as always being ambivalent about the endings of 
tragic fictions like Romeo and Juliet, when in fact we are not at all ambivalent 
about said endings. And, even in a case where we are ambivalent about the 
outcome of a fiction – as in The Sopranos example – the change of content 
solution still gets us to the wrong result, since it suggests a conflict between 
wanting X to occur and being ambivalent as to whether X occurs, when in fact 
we are only ambivalent. 
 
As such, philosophers like D&E propose the solution here is to introduce i-
desires. In the fiction case, i-desires are said to have the same content as the 
desires attributed to people by the simple solution. So for D&E, and also Currie 
and Ravenscroft, people can ‘i-desire that Romeo lives’, etc. 
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content solution is problematic, not one for why we should introduce i-desires 
rather than return to the simple solution. We will now turn to this issue. 
 
3.5 I-Desires and Fiction 
 
The motivation for introducing i-desires at this point then is, in part, to allow 
that we can have pairs of i-desires about fictional characters and desires about 
fictions.  For  example  to  allow  for  us  to  have  the  following  combination  of 
attitudes: 
 
1) I i-desire that Tony Soprano escapes from the police. 
2) I desire that the writers decide Tony Soprano’s fate in the fiction. 
 
To use Walton’s notation, we have something like ‘*I desire that Tony Soprano 
escapes from the police*’ whilst also having ‘I desire that the writers will decide 
*Tony Soprano's fate*’, with this pair involving two different attitudes. In other 
words, we have a case where it looks like *X desires P* is not entailed by it 
being true that X desires *P*. This contrasts with the case of pretend play, 
where the worry with this entailment concerned whether a desire that *P* was 
‘depressing’. 
 
However, we must still address how these i-desires behave, and how we can 
justify their introduction. At present we have reason to think something odd is 
going  on  when  we  engage  with  fictions,  but  is  unclear  precisely  why  the 
solution  to  this  puzzle  is  to  introduce  i-desires  and  what  explanatory  work 
these i-desires are supposed to be doing.  
 
A first way one might attempt to justify their introduction would be to focus on 
the negative arguments we considered in section 3.3, in order to bring out that 
genuine desires directed at fictional characters are impossible, thus restricting 
us to either the change of content or change of attitude solution. We can then 
rely  on  the  fact  that  the  change  of  content  solution  is  problematic,  for  the 
reasons  just  discussed  related  to  conflicting  desires  and  ambivalence,  and 
suggest  that  this  necessitates  the  introduction  of  i-desires.  Thus,  we  might 
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desires: we need only note that desire cannot do the trick here. Or, in other 
words,  we  can  rely  on  the  third  claim  of  chapter  1:  that  we  can  justify  the 
introduction of an imaginative counterpart if it helps us to explain puzzles and  
constraints on a mental state have been violated. 
 
But as we noted in section 3.3, attempting to place constraints on desire in the 
fiction case will prove controversial. Furthermore, we will still need to address 
how  i-desires  evade  issues  that  afflict  the  simple  solution  without  simply 
making them avoid these issues by definition (e.g. why don’t i-desires motivate 
us? Why can they be directed at non-existent things?). Merely introducing i-
desires does not solve all these puzzles. 
 
A second option for justifying the introduction of i-desires is to focus on our 
apparently conflicting desires towards fictions, and note as Walton (1978, p. 
25) did, that there seems to be something about these cases that marks them 
out as distinct from ordinary cases of conflicting desires. Having done this, we 
can then suggest that the only way to deal with this something-like-conflict is 
by proposing that we can something-like-desire things. 
 
But the issue with this move is that Walton’s own theory leaves it unclear as to 
whether or not we should introduce i-desires (and indeed Walton 2006, p. 144, 
expresses scepticism about introducing i-desires). For Walton, the something-
like-conflicting desires we appear to direct at tragic heroines are explained by 
noting that it is only fictional that we desire the safety of tragic heroines. And, 
as we noted in our discussion of amusement and the second claim of chapter 1, 
the fact that it is fictional that X is in a certain mental state does not have to be 
read as introducing an imaginative counterpart. We will return to the issue of 
what might make a desire fictional in section 3.7. 
 
Bearing  these  issues  in  mind,  there  is  no  entirely  uncontroversial  way  of 
justifying the introduction of i-desires in the fiction case. Thus as it stands we 
have no clear reason why we should favour an i-desire solution over a simple 
solution that allows for us to have pairs of desires about fictional characters 
and desires about fictions. 
 85	 ﾠ
However, Currie (2010) offers a problem case that is said to demonstrate that 
the  simple  solution  does  not  work,  regardless  of  considerations  related  to 
whether  we  can  have  genuine  desires  directed  at  fictional  characters,  or 
whether the simple solution entails the change of content solution. Currie thus 
suggests  that  we  must  embrace  either  the  change  of  attitude  or  change  of 
content solution to deal with his example, and that bearing in mind the issues 
noted in 3.4 about ambivalence and conflicting desires, the change of attitude 
solution is preferable. 
 
3.6 Desire and Not-So-Fictional Characters 
 
The starting point for Currie’s argument against the simple solution is to note 
that  some  fictions  often  cause  us  to  exhibit  what  we  might  call  a  ‘tragic 
response’ (Currie 2010, p. 632). That is to say, we often experience a certain 
tension when engaging with tragic fictions like Romeo and Juliet. 
 
Currie notes that the defender of the simple solution will have to say that this 
tension  arises  because  there  is  some  sort  of  conflict  between  our  desires 
directed at fictional characters (e.g. that tragic figures live), and our desires 
directed at fictions (e.g. that tragic figures die to make better works of fiction). 
He therefore takes defenders of the simple solution to be committed to the idea 
that we will experience a work of fiction as tragic if we both desire the death of 
one of its central character (in order for the fiction to be of a tragic sort) whilst 
also desiring their survival. 
 
To show why this is problematic, he asks us to imagine a fictional documentary 
called Death of a PM, which portrays what might have happened if Margaret 
Thatcher had been assassinated whilst in power. He notes that out of respect 
for  the  steely  professionalism  of  the  assassin,  or  just  out  of  an  interest  in 
exploring dramatic possibilities, it is not unreasonable to suppose that when 
watching the fictional documentary, someone could attest to wanting Thatcher 
to die.17 
                                                 
17 When Currie’s article was published Thatcher was still alive and in what follows I 
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The problem with this suggestion is that even though we may want her to die in 
the  fictional  documentary,  this  does  not  mean  that  in  general  we  want 
Thatcher to die. Indeed, it is perfectly reasonable to think that someone could 
want her to die in the fictional documentary, whilst also not wanting her to die 
in real life. 
 
Currie  argues  that  a  defender  of  the  simple  solution  cannot  make  this 
distinction. When watching Romeo and Juliet, one simply desires that Romeo 
lives: to say that you desire that Romeo lives in the fiction is to endorse the 
change of content solution. On the simple solution, you want Romeo to live, 
and you want the fiction Romeo and Juliet to be one where Romeo dies. Currie 
suggests that the same is true of the Thatcher case: the defender of the simple 
solution cannot say that you desire for Thatcher to live in real life; they must 
hold  that  you  want  Thatcher  to  live  simpliciter  and  want  her  to  die  in  the 
fiction. 
 
As  such,  it  seems  that  an  observer  of  Death  of  a  PM  will  have  conflicting 
desires – they will both desire that Thatcher dies and also that she lives. But, 
this means that the fictional documentary should engender a tragic response. 
However, it seems intuitive to think that this response won’t occur. One could 
watch  the  documentary  without  feeling  any  sort  of  tragic  tension  as  the 
assassin closes in on Thatcher. 
 
One might think that we can make sense of this issue by making a distinction 
between the objects of our desires that are apparently directed at Thatcher. We 
could  suggest  that  our  desire  that  she  lives  is  indeed  directed  at  the  real 
Thatcher,  but  that  our  desire  that  she  dies  is  directed  at  a  fictionalised 
Thatcher. If we make this move, we could then explain the absence of a tragic 
response by noting that the objects of our desires are different and thus there is 
no conflict between them. 
 
But this sort of move, as Friend (2003, pp. 46-50) brings out, is problematic 
because  a  fictionalised  Thatcher  is  still  Thatcher.  One  way  of  bringing  this 
point out is to note that when filmmakers make films involving real persons 
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events. How they would manage this if their films were not actually about these 
persons and events would prove mysterious. 
 
To make sense of this case, Currie suggests there are two options available to 
us. Firstly, as we hinted, we can move to the change of content solution, and 
say that we desire that Thatcher dies in the fiction and that Thatcher lives in 
real life, but this will return us to the issues related to conflicting desires and 
ambivalence  when  we  consider  fictions  like  Romeo  and  Juliet.  The  other 
option  is  to  introduce  i-desires,  and  say  something  like  we  i-desire  that 
Thatcher dies, desire that she dies in fiction and desire that she lives in real 
life. 
 
Currie takes this line and suggests that in order to have a tragic response to a 
fiction we must i-desire that such-and-such will occur whilst also genuinely 
desiring that it doesn’t occur in the fiction (Currie 2010, pp. 637-638). In the 
case of Death of a PM, we i-desire that Thatcher dies and we genuinely desire 
that she dies in the fiction. There is no conflict between these two states, and so 
the fictional documentary will not elicit a tragic response. 
 
However,  one  might  be  sceptical  of  this  argument  if  they  think  that  tragic 
responses should not be explained in terms of some sort of tension between 
our  conative  attitudes  (whether  genuine  desires  or  i-desires).  But,  there  is 
another way of making this sort of argument work, which is to note, as Friend 
(2003, p. 44) does, that sometimes when engaging with fictions involving real 
people, we want them to do things that we don’t (or didn’t) want them to do in 
real life.18 
 
In these sorts of cases, the question of how to make sense of these apparently 
conflicting desires arises once again, since these desires do not obviously cause 
                                                 
18 Friend’s discussion is concerned with emotional responses to fictions involving real 
persons, and she takes these sorts of cases to demonstrate why we should introduce 
quasi-emotions.  Her  main  example  is  the  film  JFK,  where  she  suggests  we  find 
ourselves wanting a rogue prosecutor to succeed in his goals when we know that these 
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us to feel conflicted in quite the same way that desiring that P and also desiring 
that not-P ordinarily does. Again, we can propose that the ‘desires’ we have 
related to what the person does in fiction are in fact i-desires. 
 
And so we now seem to have a problem with endorsing a desire-based solution 
to puzzles related to our engagement with fiction. If we endorse a change of 
content solution, then we risk mischaracterising our attitudes towards fictions 
and fictional characters, for example by misconstruing observers of tragedies 
as  being  ambivalent  about  their  outcomes.  If  we  deal  with  this  issue  by 
resisting  the  move  to  the  change  of  content  solution,  then  we  will  face 
Currie/Friend-type cases of fictions where we have desires directed towards 
real people that are different to those we have directed towards them in real 
life. 
 
For the remainder of this chapter, I will consider how one might respond to 
Currie’s argument and defend the simple view, thus resisting the introduction 
of i-desires. I will also give some general reasons for thinking that a desire-
based solution is preferable to an i-desire-based one in section 3.8. 
 
3.7 Difficulties with I-Desires 
 
The  first  response  one  could  make  to  Currie’s  argument  is  to  consider  his 
proposed test for i-desires, which, as we noted in the introduction, runs as 
follows (Currie 2010, p. 635): 
 
A  putative  desire,  A,  is  an  i-desire  and  not  really  a  desire  if  A  has 
satisfaction conditions, a canonical statement of which makes reference 
to a fiction which is not also the object of A. 
 
In other words, he is proposing that an apparent desire is really an i-desire if 
its satisfaction conditions refer to a fiction when the desire itself does not. So, 
for  example,  the  desire  that  Romeo  lives  is  really  an  i-desire,  since  the 
satisfaction conditions for this desire will make reference to the fiction Romeo 
and Juliet. The desire that Romeo lives in the fiction is not an i-desire since it 
refers to a fiction directly. 89	 ﾠ
The worry I have with this test is similar to the one we raised in section 1.6 
about  whether  the  distinction  between  understanding  and  quasi-
understanding  would  have  to  depend  on  factors  external  to  a  person’s 
engagement with a fiction. As I read Currie’s test, whether or not someone has 
an  i-desire  depends  not  on  their  own  awareness  of  their  engagement  with 
fiction, but instead on the mere fact that they are engaging with a fiction. 
 
This suggestion strikes me as potentially problematic. As Kind (2011, p. 423) 
notes, her young son appears to have desires directed at fictional characters, 
whilst also lacking a sophisticated understanding of what fiction is. On Currie’s 
picture, we seem to have to attribute i-desires to Kind’s son, in spite of him not 
knowing  that  the  satisfaction  conditions  of  his  ‘desires’  make  reference  to 
fictions. 
 
Now, one might think this is acceptable on the grounds that being in mental 
state X doesn’t have to entail having a concept of mental state X. However it 
still  strikes  me  as  strange  to  think  that  a  child  could  say  that  they  want 
something (such as the survival of Tinkerbell) but only actually i-desire said 
something,  not  because  of  anything  to  do  with  them,  but  simply  because 
desires directed at fictional characters are i-desires by definition. 
 
In turn, this also raises a worry related to recognition (Kind 2011, pp. 429-30). 
We are usually capable of recognising what mental state we are in, but on this 
picture,  we  will  frequently  mistake  i-desires  for  genuine  desires,  namely 
whenever we mistake something fictional for something real. Perhaps this is an 
acceptable  consequence,  but  the  defender  of  i-desires  will  owe  us  an 
explanation as to why we also apparently mistake i-desires for desires in our 
discussions  about  fictions,  since  our  everyday  language  doesn’t  contain  a 
notion of i-desiring something and we must therefore presumably frequently 
mistake i-desires for desires.  
 
We  could  also  read  Currie’s  test  in  a  subjective  way,  and  suppose  that  the 
observer of a fiction must know that the satisfaction conditions of his desire 
refer to said fiction. So, in the case of Kind’s son, he will have a genuine desire 
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to a fiction but to a fictional character.  
 
However, if we make this move, the nature of i-desires becomes somewhat 
odd. They will be the state we are in by definition whenever we realise that one 
of our desire has satisfaction conditions related to a fiction. This reading of 
Currie’s test concedes that it is possible to have desires directed at fictional 
characters when we are unaware of their fictional status, so we return to the 
starting questions of why we need to move beyond accepting that people can 
have  genuine  desires  directed  at  fictional  characters  and  what  additional 
explanatory work i-desires are supposed to be doing. 
 
Another  response  we  can  make  to  Currie’s  argument  is  to  question  the 
motivation for introducing i-desires that his case depends on. As we noted, 
Currie is suggesting that we need to introduce i-desires in part to explain our 
apparently  conflicting  attitudes  towards  one  individual.  He  then  in  turn 
suggests that it would not work to make this distinction at the level of content, 
and so introduces a change of attitude to deal with the conflict. 
 
A problem with this approach can be shown with an example from the TV 
series  Avatar:  The  Last  Airbender.  In  the  penultimate  episode,  the  main 
characters  go  to  a  theatre  where  they  watch  a  play  that  retells  their  own 
adventures.  That  is  to  say,  Avatar:  The  Last  Airbender  is  an  example  of  a 
fiction that contains a fiction within itself. 
 
As it so happens, when watching the episode, I wanted the characters to do the 
same things in the play as I did in the series itself (triumph over their enemies, 
etc.).  But  it  is  possible  that  this  could  have  been  otherwise.  The  play,  for 
example, could have shown the main characters in an unsympathetic light that 
made you root against them, whilst you continued to support their endeavours 
in the actual show. 
 
If this were so, then presumably this means you could both want the characters 
in Avatar to overcome their enemies, whilst also wanting them to fall to said 
enemies.  Currie  and  Friend  are  both  suggesting  that  a  desire  about  a 
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fictional characters fictionalised within a fiction. 
 
But this would make this a case of having conflicting i-desires: we would i-
desire that P (that they defeat their enemies) and not-P (that they fall to their 
enemies). It seems that our desire for the characters to succeed is, on Currie’s 
picture, an i-desire, since the satisfaction conditions of this desire will refer to a 
fiction.  In  turn,  it  would  seem  that  my  desires  about  the  play  within  the 
episode are also i-desires for the reasons Currie cited in relation to the Death of 
a PM case.  
 
However, this means that I could have had a straightforward conflict between 
my i-desires, which presumably would have been problematic in the way that 
having conflicting genuine desires is supposed to be, and perhaps should lead 
me to feel a tension. But it looks like no conflict would have been present here, 
and I probably would not have experienced any sort of tension. 
 
Two moves are available to deal with this conflict. Firstly, one could bite the 
bullet and accept that this shows we need to introduce i-i-desires to deal with 
these  desire-like  states  at  the  attitude  level,  but  then  we  risk  falling  into  a 
regress  of  desire-like  states  whenever  we  have  a  fiction  embedded  within  a 
fiction. 
 
Another move would be to say that these i-desires are differentiated at the level 
of  content:  one  i-desire  is  about  what  we  want  for  the  main  characters  in 
Avatar, the other is about what we want for them in the play contained within 
Avatar.  We  can  thus  deny  that  having  different  i-desires  about  the  same 
characters is always problematic: if the characters are in multiple fictions I can 
have different i-desires about them relative to the fictions they appear in. 
 
But, this looks like it just returns us to the problems we noted earlier with 
endorsing a change of content solution, i.e. issues related to conflicting desires 
and ambivalence. It is unclear why a change of content solution applied to i-
desires would be more palatable than one applied to genuine desires.  
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exhibit clustering, in the sense of being relative to one fictional world. Bearing 
this  in  mind,  we  can  propose  that  fiction  within  a  fiction  cases  are  not 
problematic, since i-desires only apply to a single fictional world (Friend 2003, 
p. 48). In this way, we can allow that i-desires are somehow differentiated by 
the fictions they concern, but without this entailing that the content of the i-
desires relates to a fiction rather than to a fictional character.  
 
However, this move leaves open the question of what marks out the fictional 
world an i-desire is directed at, so more work would still need to be done to 
explain why the content of i-desires needn’t make reference to the fictional 
world  they  relate  to.  And,  perhaps  more  importantly,  we  would  need  an 
explanation as to why genuine desires cannot be afforded a similar luxury. 
 
This brings us onto the issue we introduced at the end of section 3.5, where we 
noted that for Walton (1978, p. 25) the central issue here is that our desire that 
Romeo  lives  (or  that  Thatcher  dies,  etc.)  is  fictional.  This  point  raises  the 
question  of  what  makes  it  fictional  that  we  desire  something.  The  i-desire 
response is to suggest that what makes a desire fictional is when the desire is 
actually an i-desire. But, we noted in my second claim in chapter 2, this is not 
the only option available for explaining how a desire is rendered fictional. 
 
Another way of explaining what makes some desires fictional is to note that our 
desires about fictions themselves are not fictional in Walton’s sense. It is not 
fictional that you want Romeo and Juliet to have a tragic ending, since it is not 
fictional that you have any desires (or beliefs) about the fiction itself. 
 
In light of this point, we could propose that the problems here can be dealt 
with by setting out which of our genuine desires transfer over into the games of 
make-believe we play with fictions. If this is right, then what is going on in the 
cases considered above is that we do indeed have conflicting desires in some 
sense, but it is only fictional that we have the desire for the tragic heroine to 
live, or Thatcher to die, etc., and not fictional that we want the tragic heroine to 
die, or Thatcher to live etc. (since these desires refer to the fiction and the real 
world  respectively),  and  so  it  is  also  not  fictional  that  we  have  conflicting 
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Now, one still might think the best way to make sense of this is by introducing 
i-desires,  but  as  we  noted  in  relation  to  amusement  when  bringing  out  my 
second claim in chapter 1, just because it is fictional that you find X amusing 
doesn’t  mean  you  aren’t  also  genuinely  amused  by  X.  Likewise,  if  you  are 
genuinely  amused  by  a  fiction,  this  doesn’t  make  it  fictional  that  you  are 
amused by a fiction: it makes it fictional that you are amused. We can make a 
parallel move here to make sense of the relation between desire and fiction. 
 
Both the simple view and the change of content view can fit into this sort of 
picture. We can either allow that desires can be directed at fictional characters 
and that it is also sometimes fictional that we have these desires, or we can 
propose that in some cases our genuine desires that in fiction such-and-such 
will occur make it fictionally the case that we desire that character X will do Y.  
 
I  maintain  the  simple  solution  is  preferable,  and  that  there  is  no  obvious 
reason to be forced away from it, but one who disagrees on this score can still 
deal  with  our  problems  here  by  linking  Walton’s  approach  to  a  change  of 
content solution and thus still resist the introduction of i-desires. As such, it 
looks like we can solve the puzzles about the relation between our desires and 
our engagement with fictions without introducing i-desires, which takes away 
our remaining justification for introducing them, since we also could not do so 
on the basis of constraints on genuine desires.  
 
To conclude this chapter, I am going to make some general points as to why we 
might  think  genuine  desires  are  involved  in  our  engagement  with  fictions, 
regardless of whether we endorse the simple or change of content solution. 
 
3.8 In Defence of Desire 
 
The first point to make is that when engaging with fictions, contra Walton, we 
do sometimes feel conflicted about what we want to happen (or at least we 
behave as if we are conflicted or report ourselves as feeling a certain sort of 
tension). When watching Romeo and Juliet, there does seem to be some sort of 
sense  in  which  I  would  like  to  be  able  to  shout  out  to  Romeo  (figuratively 
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their deaths are essential for the tragic narrative and that I cannot interfere 
with their world. As we noted, according to Currie (2010), a genuine desire 
account will say this conflict is felt because you have two mutually exclusive 
desires – what can the defender of i-desires say to explain this tension? 
 
Currie (2010, pp. 637-638) suggests that this feeling of tension arises because 
we have an i-desire that is at odds with our genuine desires about fictions. But 
why does holding conflicting desires/i-desires cause us to feel this way? 
 
We can bring the problem here into focus by noting that it is usually agreed 
that we have no problem entertaining conflicting belief-like imaginings and 
beliefs,  and  a  consequence  of  this  innocuous  point  is  that  we  do  not  feel 
conflicted  when  our  propositional  imaginings  and  beliefs  contradict.  For 
example, I can believe that David Cameron is Prime Minister and also imagine 
what life would be like if Gordon Brown were still Prime Minister, without 
finding myself feeling conflicted. Why would one think i-desires are different? 
Why would we feel conflicted about our conflicting i-desires/desires and not 
about our conflicting imaginings/beliefs (Nichols 2004b, p. 333)? 
 
Currie (2010, pp. 637-638) answers this question by drawing attention to the 
fact that both desires and i-desires have satisfaction conditions, and that some 
have identical satisfaction conditions. He argues that it is only natural for us to 
feel conflicted when these satisfaction conditions are mutually exclusive. But 
this moves us back to the initial question of what exactly an i-desire is, and why 
conflicts between the satisfaction conditions of i-desires and genuine desires 
are felt. 
 
In  addition  to  worries  about  whether  i-desires  can  make  sense  of  someone 
feeling conflicted when engaging with fiction, we can also note that the i-desire 
solution does not necessarily make sense of how we evaluate our responses to 
fictions unless we develop our account of i-desires further. This point is noted 
in relation to the emotions by Moran (1994, pp. 93-94) and applied to the case 
of desire more specifically by Kind (2011, pp. 430-431). 
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TV show Breaking Bad. The main character is a high school chemistry teacher, 
Walter White, who has started a new career as a crystal meth producer, and the 
show  charts  his  descent  into  the  criminal  underworld.  When  watching  the 
show, I found myself rooting for Walt and wanting him to get out of awkward 
situations.  However,  when  I  reflected  on  the  fact  that  I  had  these  sorts  of 
responses to the show I felt uneasy – I wanted a drug baron to get away with 
his crimes? I wanted him to kill his rivals? In real life, I certainly don’t want 
people like Walt to be running around – I want them locked away. Indeed, 
even in other fictions I usually want drug barons to be safely behind bars. 
 
The central point here is that it seems plausible to suppose that the reason I 
find my conative responses to Breaking Bad so troubling is because they are 
genuine desires about what I want to happen to Walter White. If they were 
mere i-desires, it is unclear why I ought to feel troubled by them, unless of 
course, we build into our account of what an i-desire is the idea that having i-
desires that conflict with your real desires will make you feel uneasy. 
 
Furthermore, when viewers discuss the series, they often make a big deal about 
which  criminal  act  performed  by  Walt  was  the  one  that  made  them  stop 
rooting for him. It strikes me that viewers’ answers to this question would not 
be so interesting if they merely told us about when their i-desires changed, as 
opposed  to  their  real  desires.  Why  would  we  be  interested  in  someone’s  i-
desires changing?  
 
One way for a defender of i-desires to respond to this sort of worry is to argue 
that we just do find it interesting to enquire about what i-desires people have, 
but to make this defence we will require a thorough account of what i-desires 
are, and how they behave, and such an account is not forthcoming in Currie 
(2010) and D&E (2007, 2011). 
 
As such, it seems that introducing i-desires in the present case is potentially 
puzzling in the same way that introducing a notion of quasi-understanding was 
puzzling. We do not naturally worry about whether we can have real desires 
directed at fictional characters, and bringing i-desires into the picture serves to 
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worries  about  why  we  care  about  our  i-desires  and  why  they  make  us  feel 
conflicted. 
 
In other words, the introduction of i-desires does not appear to solve all the 
puzzles related to our conative engagement with fictions and also introduces its 
own  problems.  Bearing  this  in  mind,  I  think  we  would  be  better  served  by 
attempting to develop either the simple or change of content solution to work 
out  precisely  how  desire  behaves  in  the  context  of  our  engagement  with 
fictions. There is not enough space to do this at present, but I hope to have at 
least shown that some sort of genuine desire approach is preferable to an i-
desire-based solution. 
 
3.9 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have seen that some philosophers have argued that we need 
to introduce i-desires to make sense of the desires that are apparently directed 
towards fictional characters. 
 
A  first  way  to  get  to  this  position  is  to  argue  that  the  ‘desires’  directed  at 
fictional characters cannot be real desires because they relate to non-existents, 
or are motivationally inert, etc. But this move is problematic since there is no 
consensus about what constraints are present on our ordinary desires. 
 
The  second  way  of  getting  to  i-desires  works  by  noting  that  desires  about 
fictional characters have to be paraphrased as desires about fiction, and then 
bringing out that this mischaracterises our attitudes towards the outcomes of 
fictions (by portraying us as ambivalent about the endings of tragedies, etc.). 
But, it remains unclear whether we should feel forced to adopt this view, and it 
is  unclear  how  to  move  from  this  issue  to  defending  the  introduction  of  i-
desires rather than returning to the simple solution. 
 
In addition to these worries, the introduction of i-desires brings with it many of 
its own mysteries related to our engagement with fictions –	 ﾠ for example, the 
question of why we care about the i-desires we have in response to fictions. 
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As  such,  we  once  again  have  good  reason  to  refrain  from  introducing  an 
imaginary counterpart to desire. We will be better served by considering what 
sort of desire-based account can make sense of our engagement with fictions, 
rather than introducing a new mental state to do the work.   98	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Conclusion 
 
We have considered three cases where the introduction of i-desires has been 
thought  necessary:  third  person  mindreading,  pretend  play  and  our 
engagement with fictions. In each case I have argued that the introduction of i-
desires is unnecessary since we can explain the puzzles related to these cases 
without them.  
 
As  I  noted  in  my  third  claim  of  chapter  1,  to  justify  the  introduction  of  a 
counterpart we must establish that there are either constraints on the mental 
state  it  is  a  counterpart  to,  or  establish  that  the  counterpart  helps  to  solve 
puzzles. We cannot justify the introduction of i-desires in either of these ways. 
 
In the case of mindreading, we can explain our ability to predict the actions of 
others and ascribe mental states to them without introducing a counterpart to 
desire by adopting a theory-theory view.  In the case of pretence, we can make 
sense of what motivates pretend play by allowing that children can desire to 
make things fictionally true. And,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ fiction	 ﾠ case,	 ﾠ  although it is hard to pin 
down the correct account of the desires we apparently direct towards fictional 
characters there is still reason to be suspicious of thinking that these desires 
are really i-desires. 
 
In addition, as we saw in section 1.8 and throughout chapters 2 and 3, it is hard 
to pin down exactly what an i-desire would be, in part because it is hard to pin 
down what a desire is. For example, attempts such as Velleman’s to get clearer 
on the notion prove problematic because they make strong claims about the 
limits of our desires. This is likely why Doggett and Egan refrain from offering 
a  detailed  account  of  the  difference  between  desires  and  i-desires  beyond 
noting that they have different functional roles. 
 
The final point to bring out is that i-desires seem to be thought of as behaving 
very differently in each of the problem cases we have discussed. In the case of 
mindreading,  i-desires  seem  to  be  thought  of  as  similar  to  belief-like 
imaginings, in the sense of being largely subject to the will. However, as seen in 
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problematic, since we cannot simply decide to take different conative attitudes 
towards fictions. 
 
Furthermore, when it comes to explaining our engagement with fictions and 
our mindreading abilities, i-desires are supposed to lack the motivational force 
of genuine desires: wanting Romeo’s survival will not make you leap onto the 
stage  to  save  him,  and  imagining  wanting  to  eat  a  tuna  sandwich  (when 
simulating  someone’s  desire)  will  not  necessarily  make  you  eat  a  tuna 
sandwich.  
 
On the other hand, in the pretend play case, i-desires are supposed to play an 
important  role  in  explaining  what  motivates  children’s  pretend  actions. 
Bearing this in mind, it appears that the notion of an i-desire introduced to 
make  sense  of  pretend  play  behaves  differently  as  compared  to  the  one 
introduced  to  make  sense  of  our  engagement  with  fictions  and  our 
mindreading abilities. 
 
In light of this, we have no answer to my initial worries about whether i-desires 
should be thought of as quasi-motivational, or quasi-pleasurable etc. And, if we 
accept that they will behave in different ways in different cases, this returns us 
to the problem we noted in relation to a cluster theory of desire about how we 
should distinguish between genuine desires that lack certain features and full 
blown i-desires. 
 
This worry is important because it means we cannot rely on a global argument 
for justifying the introduction of i-desires based on how useful they are for 
explaining various phenomena. Doggett and Egan (2007), for example, go on 
from their discussion of pretend play to discuss fiction in order to strengthen 
the case for introducing i-desires.  
 
Likewise, Currie and Ravenscroft move from noting the need for i-desires to 
make  sense  of  our  ability  to  mindread  to  how  they  are  able  to  explain  our 
engagement with fiction. However, if i-desires have to behave differently in all 
these cases, we will need to consider each case on its own merits, and as we 
have  seen,  it  is  not  clear  that  any  one  case  offers  a  compelling  reason  for 100	 ﾠ
introducing i-desires. 
 
Bearing all this in mind, we should therefore resist the introduction of i-desires 
into our cognitive architecture. We would be better served in future research 
attempting to develop how our desires behave in the various activities we have 
discussed and developing a more thorough account of the nature of desire. 
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